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PREFACE 
 
 
The European Union member states declared in June 1999 that the EU shall 
play its full role on the international stage. To that end, they decided to 
create necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities, 
including the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces. Since then, in some five years, the ESDP has become, not 
only a success story, but also a real option for political leaders to use it 
when deemed appropriate. This option contains, among others, a 60.000-
strong force, the institutional structure and procedures to facilitate political 
and military decision-making, as well as planning and command and 
control mechanisms. The European Defence Agency has been established 
for further development of necessary capabilities. Moreover, the EU has 
been involved in several military and police operations in the Balkans and 
Africa gaining valuable collective experience on the field, and several 
hundreds of military personnel are working on a daily basis in the EU 
structures for the fulfilment of the European Security Strategy. 
 
Pertaining to the topic of this publication, the European Union 
Battlegroups, in 2003 several initiatives regarding more substantial 
cooperation was agreed upon in order to deepen military relations between 
the member states. Building on the success of operations Concordia, 
Proxima and, as a turning point, Operation Artemis together with needs 
stemming from the European Security Strategy, France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom introduced the so-called Battlegroup concept in order to 
create a capacity for rapid reaction. In this context, the availability of 
rapidly deployable military units entered to discussion. Of course, a 
capacity for rapid reaction had previously been recognized as an essential 
tool for a wide range of crisis management operations, but at this stage 
there was enough common will to go forward, too.  
 
Since then we have been in the middle of a lively discussion related to the 
European Union Battlegroups. Consequently, the rationale for this 
publication, in addition to the traditional role of the Department to provide 
information and aspects, is a common need to promote analysis of the EU 
Battlegroup concept as an important tool for future crisis management. In 
order to reach these goals, some argumentation based on facts and figures 
as well as some ‘food for though’ is offered for the reader. Due to the fact 
that a profound conversation facilitates and promotes deeper understanding, 
the publication of this study is coordinated with the conference on 
‘Developing European Crisis-Management Capabilities’ co-organised by 
the Atlantic Council of Finland and the European Security Forum, on 28th 
April 2005 in Helsinki. 
 
The content of the study dealing with two national projects is an excellent 
example of the fruitful cooperation with our Swedish counterparts. On 
behalf of the authors and the Department, I would like to express our 
gratitude to all the experts in Brussels, Stockholm and Helsinki who 
provided the authors with valuable information, good advice and critical 
comments.  
 
Helsinki, 28th April 2005 
 
 
 
Lieutenant Colonel, Lic.Pol.Sci.  Juha Pyykönen 
Director of the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies 
National Defence College 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
 
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Mika Kerttunen, Tommi Koivula, Tommy Jeppsson       1 
 
 
EU BATTLEGROUP: THE BIG PICTURE 
Tommi Koivula           5 
 
 
THE CONCEPT 
Mika Kerttunen         23 
 
 
SWEDEN 
Tommy Jeppsson         51 
 
 
FINLAND 
Mika Kerttunen         73 
 
 
AUTHOR PRESENTATION       93 
 
Abbreviations and Acronyms  
 
 
AMOS  Advanced Mortar System 
An  Antonov 
ARRC  Allied Rapid Reaction Corps 
 
BG  Battlegroup 
BGHQ  Battlegroup Headquarters 
BU  Budgetunderlag, Budget Proposition 
 
C  Cargo 
ca  Circa 
CAS  Close Air Support 
CD-ROM  Compact Disk – Read Only Memory 
C2  Command and Control 
C4I Command, Control, Communication, Computers 
and Intelligence 
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CIMIC  Civil-Military Cooperation 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States 
CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management 
CJA  Council Joint Action 
CMC  Crisis Management Concept 
CONOPS  Concept of Operations 
COPS Comité Politique et de Securité, Political and 
Security Committee 
COREPER  Committee of Permanent Representatives 
CS  Combat Support 
CSS  Combat Service Support 
CV  Combat Vehicle 
 
DN  Dagens Nyheter 
DNAK Den Norske Atlanterhavskomité, Norwegian 
Atlantic Council 
DOS  Days of Supply 
Dr  Doctor 
 
ECAP  European Capability Action Plan 
ed/eds   Editor/Editors 
EDA  European Defence Agency 
e g  exempli gratia, for example 
ES  Estonia 
ESDI  European Security and Defence Identity 
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy 
ESS  European Security Strategy 
EU  European Union 
EUBG  European Union Battlegroup 
EUMC  European Union Military Committee  
EUMS  European Union Military Staff 
 
FA  Fighter/Attack  
FAC  Forward Air Controller 
FCdr  Force Commander 
FHQ  Force Headquarters 
FI  Finland 
FN  Förenta Nationerna, United Nations 
FOC  Full Operational Capability 
FOI Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, Swedish Total 
Defence Research Institute 
FöU Försvarsutskottet, Parliamentary Committee on 
Defence 
 
GAD  Global Approach Deployability 
GAERC  General Affairs and External Relation Council 
GE  Germany 
 
HFC  Helsinki Force Catalogue 
HG  Headline Goal 
HHG  Helsinki Headline Goal 
HKV  Högkvarteret, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters 
HPC  Headline Progress Catalogue 
HQ  Headquarter(s) 
HS  Helsingin Sanomat 
HUMINT  Human Intelligence 
 
i e  id est, that is 
IEMF  Interim Emergency Multinational Force 
IFOR  Implementation Force 
IMD  Initiating Military Directive 
IO  Interoperability Objective 
IOC  Interim Operative Capability 
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance 
ITOW Improved Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-
guided 
 
KFOR  Kosovo Force 
kg  kilogram  
km   kilometre 
 
LPD  Landing Platform Deck 
 
m    metre 
mm   millimetre 
MFA  Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
MOD  Ministry of Defence 
MONUC Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en 
Républic Démocratique du Congo, United Nations 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
MSO  Military Strategic Option 
 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NBC  Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
NBF  Nätverksbaserad försvar, Network-Based Defence 
NL  The Netherlands 
NO  Norway 
No  Number 
NORDCAPS Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace 
Support  
NRF NATO Response Force 
 
OHQ  Operation Headquarter 
OpCdr  Operation Commander 
OPLAN  Operation Plan 
 
p./pp.  page/pages  
PARP  Planning and Review Program 
PfP  Partnership for Peace 
PG  Partnership Goal 
POL  Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants 
PSC  Political and Security Committee  
 
ROE  Rules of Engagement 
Ro/Ro  Roll on Roll off 
RRF  Rapid Response/Reaction Force 
RUSI  Royal United Services Institute  
 
SALIS  Strategic Air Lift Interim Solution 
SCC  Sealift Coordination Centre 
SEK  Svenska Kroner, Swedish Crowns 
SG/HR  Secretary General/High Representative 
SHAPE  Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
SIPRI  Swedish International Peace Research Institute 
SRA  Security and Risk Assessment 
STRA UTVS INRI Strategiledningen utvecklingsstaben 
inriktningsavdelningen, Swedish Armed Forces 
Headquarters, Strategic Plans and Policy 
SW  Sweden 
 
tn   metric tonne 
 
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland 
UN  United Nations 
USA  United States of America 
US/U.S.  United States 
UTVA  Ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittinen ministerivaliokunta, 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy 
 
WEU Western European Union 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction  
 1
INTRODUCTION 
Mika Kerttunen, Tommi Koivula, Tommy Jeppsson 
 
 
The great British political philosopher Sir Isaiah Berlin wrote in one of his 
most famous essays about foxes and hedgehogs. More precisely about us 
people who according to him can be divided to foxes and hedgehogs. A fox 
is someone who knows many things; a hedgehog knows one big thing. We, 
the writers do not see us as hedgehogs who know one big thing, the 
Battlegroup, properly, but as foxes who know many little things within the 
phenomenon. We talk about politics at international and domestic level, 
tackle strategic, operative and tactical problems, elaborate decision-making 
processes and mention essential issues like rules of engagement or 
financing. We focus on Sweden and we focus on Finland. We also let some 
relevant issues like logistics, command and control, force generation or 
manning go. We feel that we foxes have right to do so. 
 
The purposes of the study are twofold: firstly, to provide the audience with 
some basic facts regarding the Battlegroup concept, and secondly, to 
contribute to the ongoing debate with our analysis, interpretations and even 
normative opinions. Risk is that neither one of the goals can be achieved 
and that we fall in-between. The same can be said about the Battlegroup 
concept.  
 
The plan of the book is as follows. In chapter 1 Tommi Koivula provides 
the political and theoretical overview of the European Security and 
Defence Policy in general and the Battlegroups in particular. Chapter 2 sets 
out a more detailed analysis of the very context. Mika Kerttunen returns in 
his survey to the institutional roots of the whole enterprise and continues 
with an analysis of the capacities and capabilities of the Battlegroups. The 
chapter ends with an overview of the current EU planning and decision-
making procedures, spiced with some normative remarks. Tommy 
Jeppsson explores in chapter 3 the concept from a Swedish perspective. He 
sets the role of a Framework nation Sweden has in context with the 
transformation process the Swedish Armed Forces are going through and 
with the existing Nordic peace support cooperation. Mika Kerttunen then 
examines why and how Finland for her part is participating international 
crisis management and in two Battlegroups.  
 
Despite or rather because of the four different perspectives the book has, 
the chapters are partly overlapping. This, we think, makes it possible for 
the reader to get a picture broad enough from each individual chapter. We 
have not tried to combine these perspectives into single concluding remarks 
nor present any lessons learned. Our excuse is that the early phase of this 
EU rapid response arrangement limits one’s capability to detect the real and 
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relevant lessons learned. The litmus test of the whole enterprise is the first 
operation. Then is the right moment to discuss about the questions of 
decision-making in times of crisis and analyse the execution of the actual 
operation. For the moment our rapid response type of analyses focuses on 
the background and the content of the enterprise.  
 
Traditionally, the European Union has had a wide range of security 
political tools at its disposal but it has lacked a military dimension. The 
basic logic behind the development of the European Security and Defence 
Policy ESDP and the EU Battlegroup concept is that the EU, in addition to 
its other strengths, must have at its disposal a certain level of forces at a 
certain state of readiness and operational efficiency. This capability would 
widen its range of options when faced with a crisis and would facilitate 
decision-making at the highest political level. The EU Battlegroup concept 
is a practical step into that direction.  
 
A Battlegroup is tactical unit. As such it possesses formidable military 
capacity, especially when it is backed by operational and strategic enablers. 
Its capability in crisis management can nevertheless be questioned. There 
might exist a performance gap between the desired political impacts and 
the delivered military execution. The European Union has to settle for or 
find crisis that are severe enough to be pacified and small enough to be 
handled by an autonomous Battlegroup, i.e. a reinforced battalion. The EU 
perhaps needs to return to and focus on the original goals of the Council of 
Helsinki 1999. We say that size matters and that the EU, too, should have a 
bigger toolbox for her potentially offensive expeditionary operations.  
 
Swedish defence is undergoing great changes, a transformation from the 
invasion centred to a network based and internationally oriented defence. 
At the same time Sweden has taken the responsibility of the Framework 
Nation for a Nordic Battlegroup. She has committed to contribute with the 
1100+ strong force consisting e.g. of the bulks of the Operational and Force 
Headquarters and of the mechanised infantry battalion. Yet the Nordic 
countries, including non-EU member Norway and the out-of-the-ESDP 
Denmark, have for long worked to establish a Nordic Brigade for 
international crisis management. How this arrangement could be used is 
also discussed, we even dare to question whether it would be a better 
solution.  
 
Finland has chosen to contribute to two Battlegroup packages; to a German 
and to a Nordic one. The decision is analysed from the perspective of the 
overall Finnish security policy, crisis management policy included. 
Essential for Finland is the primacy of national defence and that even the 
Battlegroup contributions are seen and ought to enhance this goal. 
Participation requires that the current Peacekeeping Act will be adjusted to 
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allow also other than EU-mandated operations. Other open questions like 
financing, manning, training and exercises and material can be solved 
within the current frameworks. A national Battlegroup, or a Framework 
Nation responsibility, on the other hand would prove to be too heavy 
investment for Finland. Similarly one could ask for how long the Member 
States will hang up to the 13 Battlegroups gloriously promised in 2004 and 
when they, the EU, will decide to reduce the number.  
 
 
Academically it could have been more rewarding to concentrate on few 
issues, to find, read and interpret every document, to interview the 
decision-makers, and to analyse causes and consequences within the EU 
Battlegroup concept. A hedgehog could have dug such a hole. However, as 
some things move at the speed of light, it is, we feel, better to be a fox. 
 
 
 
Kruununhaka, April 2005 
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EU BATTLEGROUP: THE BIG PICTURE 
Tommi Koivula 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The pages of this chapter are devoted to the questions of why and how the 
European Union Battlegroup concept came into existence and what are its 
implications. The inquiry is thus focused on the EU level and the general 
political background of the Battlegroup concept – what were the factors 
outside and within the EU that affected the way the concept took shape. 
Included is a short commentary on the possibility of analysing the subject 
matter with the help of various theories of international politics. 
 
With this general perspective in mind, this paper can be read as an 
introduction to the following articles by Mika Kerttunen and Tommy 
Jeppsson, which will discuss the EU Battlegroup concept itself in a more 
detailed fashion and offer the Finnish and Swedish perspectives, 
emphasising the respective military considerations in these countries. 
 
Naturally, the emergence of the EU Battlegroup concept, not to mention the 
wider European Security and Defence Policy, the ESDP, to which it is 
closely related, is a consequence of a complicated and longstanding process 
of European integration. To tell their whole story would require at least a 
whole book. Due to the practical limitations, the discussion below is 
doomed to be superficial in many respects. For example, a number of 
ongoing debates regarding the Battlegroup concept have to be skipped 
altogether. Notwithstanding these limitations, it is hoped that this paper 
will serve as a starting point for readers in need of a basic knowledge of 
this topical issue. 
 
 
Painful Lessons of the Post-Cold War World 
 
The story of coordinated European defence was in practice a taboo during 
the Cold War. There was an effort to initiate an arrangement called the 
European Defence Community, which would have included the potentiality 
of a European army, but it failed to be ratified in August 1954. Although 
the Western European Union (WEU) was occasionally resorted to as a 
European forum for discussing security questions, its military significance 
and political role were marginal. Thus Western European security remained 
a NATO monopoly until the fall of the Berlin Wall.1  
                                                 
1 These considerations, of course, do not apply to the neutral European states or to those 
committed to the Warsaw Pact. 
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After the end of the Cold War, a latent division of labour emerged between 
the European Community, which was focused on economic integration, and 
the Atlantic Alliance, which found fresh impetus in laying the foundations 
for new political relations with liberated Central and Eastern European 
countries.2 
 
Some efforts were made towards stronger coordination of European 
countries’ foreign policies, but they met with no success. However, 
progress was more significant in the field of foreign policy. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty in 1993 saw the birth of the second pillar of 
European integration, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
which, after bitter negotiations, included the phrase “which might in time 
lead to a common defence”.3  
 
It was soon realised, however, that the post-Cold War world, or post-Cold 
War Europe for that matter, did not prove to be the peaceful and ever more 
prosperous place that had been anticipated in the most optimistic accounts. 
A striking and tragic lesson in this was provided in Yugoslavia, where a 
series of bloody wars erupted after 1991. Europeans in general and the EU 
in particular were both anxious and frustrated to see that they were almost 
completely helpless during several years of brutal war, political instability 
and continuous violations of international justice by all parties. A further 
embarrassment for the Europeans was that a political solution to the 
Balkans crisis was only reached after NATO, in other words the United 
States, a non-European power, became resolute enough to use its political 
and military might to enforce peace in the area – after the various and often 
contradictory European voices had fallen on deaf ears. 
 
Another painful reminder of Europe’s inability to act took place in Rwanda 
during the spring of 1994, when a full-scale genocide was perpetrated by 
the extreme Hutus close to the Rwandan government within a matter of 
only a few weeks, causing the death of at least 800 000 people. All this 
time the international community looked on and wondered if something 
ought to be done.  
 
These tragedies were not just examples of European powerlessness, 
however. Another failed organisation in this respect was the United 
Nations, for in a more general sense these cases illustrated the severe 
shortcomings of the multilateral approach to international crisis 
management.  
                                                 
2 European Defence. A Proposal for a White Paper. Report of an independent Task 
Force. Institute for Security Studies, European Union, Paris, May 2004, p.37. 
3 See article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty.  
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This was particularly distressing from the European perspective, since the 
European Union was composed of a number of small and medium-sized 
states very closely connected to the world economy and with strong 
interests in maintaining peace and stability all over the world. Europe was 
already a prominent player in world politics, being a major donor of 
international aid and assistance and producing a large share of the world’s 
GDP. Still, regarding the capacity to affect military crises elsewhere, the 
EU and its individual member states lacked the necessary resources. The 
Europeans were natural proponents of multilateral cooperation, but this 
unfortunately did not seem to work.  
 
Militarily, the Europeans were almost totally dependent on the resources of 
their powerful ally, the United States. Basically, the United States wanted 
to encourage the development of better European crisis management 
capabilities, at least to the extent that these capabilities would not challenge 
U.S. Military might. The Americans wanted its allies to do more, either on 
a bilateral basis with the American military, or within a UN or NATO 
framework, or even within a purely European framework on occasions 
when the U.S. decided not to be involved. 
 
Thus, step by step, a new kind of understanding of the very basic European 
security deficit became widespread: even though Europe’s political and 
economic capabilities were considerable, and even though the use of force 
was neither regarded as the first nor the only way to deal with regional or 
international crises, such as those in Yugoslavia or Rwanda, it became ever 
more common to judge that the EU must have at its disposal a certain level 
of forces at a certain state of readiness and operational efficiency, if only to 
widen its range of options when faced with a crisis and to facilitate 
decision-making at the highest political level.4 
 
As a consequence of these experiences, a reorganisation of Europe’s 
military forces began in June 1992, brought about first and foremost by the 
WEU, which defined its operational roles in the Petersberg Declaration. 
These, later referred to as the “Petersberg Tasks” included ‘humanitarian 
and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and also tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management including peacemaking’.5  
 
The Petersberg Tasks, although not yet defined by the European Union at 
that time, were the first expression of Europe’s new strategic environment. 
It is significant that these tasks included a strong element of civilian crisis 
management, and that actual combat was just one element among others. 
All the same, from now on the aim of the Europeans was a reorganisation 
                                                 
4 European Defence, p.6. 
5 For the text of the Petersberg Declaration, see www.weu.int. 
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of defence, the purpose of which was to allow force projection and the 
management of far-off crises.6 This reorganisation turned out to be a slow 
business, however. 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1996 marked the beginning of a conscious 
development of the European Union’s crisis management capabilities. The 
main significance of the Treaty was that, thanks to an initiative by two new 
member states with a background of neutrality, Sweden and Finland, the 
Petersberg Tasks were incorporated into it and thus into the EU agenda.7   
 
 
The Emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy 
 
During this process of building the CFSP a spectrum of opinion on 
European defence had emerged within the EU. It ran from countries such as 
the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands, which had been consistently keen 
on maintaining NATO, and thus U.S., involvement in Europe, to France 
and Belgium, which had been most interested in building a separate EU 
capacity. Those members who had been traditionally neutral (Austria, 
Finland, Sweden and Ireland) had in turn been less ambitious about 
building anything resembling a ”European army”.8  
 
Leaving this spectrum of opinions aside, European defence issues have 
traditionally been dominated by two member countries, France and Great 
Britain. Thus it was no surprise that the launching of an independent 
European security and defence policy was based on a declaration made by 
                                                 
6 European Defence, p.41. 
7 The considerable role of Sweden and Finland in the Amsterdam Treaty, and thus also 
in the birth of the EU Battlegroups, is somewhat ironic, because the Battlegroups can be 
seen as an unintended consequence of their policy. Once the two countries were in the 
EU, their scepticism towards any European defence arrangement was directed at the 
Maastricht Treaty and its formulation of the notion of an eventual common defence. It 
therefore became important for them to use their influence to avoid any such 
development. Thus, in April 1996, the foreign ministers of Sweden, Lena Hjelm-
Wallén, and Finland, Tarja Halonen, published an article in the morning papers Dagens 
Nyheter and Helsingin Sanomat in which they suggested that the EU should enhance its 
role and capabilities within the area of conflict management. This was the beginning of 
a Swedish-Finnish initiative that led to the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the 
Amsterdam Treaty. This ‘demilitarisation’ of the EU’s security dimension was 
perceived both in Finland and in Sweden as a major diplomatic success, since it meant 
that development towards collective defence had been avoided and that participation in 
the European security dimension was compatible with a non-alignment policy. 
However, their joint initiative did actually promote a form of European defence in 
which they now more or less have to participate - the EU Battlegroup. Dagens Nyheter 
21.4.1996, Helsingin Sanomat 21.4.1996. 
8 A separate case is that of Denmark, which does not participate in elaborating or 
implementing EU policies with defence implications. 
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these two at St. Malo, in December 1998. Much more surprising for many 
was the fact they were able to find a common understanding over the future 
of European defence in their declaration. This St. Malo Declaration can in 
many senses be interpreted as a small revolution in the European security 
setting.9 
 
The background to the declaration lay to a large extent in the minds of the 
British. By 1998, the Blair government had grown increasingly frustrated 
over Europe’s operational powerlessness, despite its economic size, which 
was considerably greater than that of the US, and concluded that if the 
imbalance between the Europeans and Americans continued the 
foundations of the Atlantic partnership would in the long term be 
jeopardised. It was estimated by the British that the only way to solve this 
problem and to safeguard the future of Atlantic Alliance would be to 
develop European defence capabilities somehow.  
  
On the other hand, France had traditionally been perhaps the strongest 
advocate of the EU as a security policy actor and had seen it as a way of 
being better able to safeguard French interests. The EU has traditionally 
been regarded by France as a necessary counterbalance to the perceived US 
global dominance, and in many senses this is still the case today. 
 
Now, at St. Malo, however, the French were willing to make a compromise 
by confessing the legitimacy of the Atlantic partnership – which was a 
necessary prerequisite for any European defence arrangement as far as the 
British were concerned. The frustrating experiences in the Balkans also 
played a significant role in this case, as the recent experience of joint 
military operations in that area helped the two countries to create an 
atmosphere of deepening mutual cooperation. 
 
Thus, a historic compromise was reached between two major European 
military actors, combining the European capacity for autonomous military 
action desired by the French with the conformity with the European 
countries’ obligations to the Atlantic Alliance required by the British. As 
the St. Malo Declaration puts it: 
“…The European Union must have the capacity for autonomous 
action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to 
use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises. 
                                                 
9Harjulehto, Mikko, “Puolustusyhteistyö ensisijaisesti kriisinhallintaa: Euroopan 
unionille nopean toiminnan valmiusjoukkoja”. Sotilasaikakauslehti 5/2004, p.19. 
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 … In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the 
European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in 
world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective 
obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a 
modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the 
collective defence of its members.”10 
It was also stated in the declaration that “In order for the European Union 
to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole 
is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a 
capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability 
for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking 
account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations 
with the EU”. 
 
The logic behind this entente was clear, and so was its importance. It was 
and remains a generally known fact that Britain and France were the two 
most influential EU countries in terms of security and defence issues. 
Consequently, when these two countries reached agreement on the need for 
an autonomous European security and defence policy and presented their 
common position to the other EU countries, a rapid Europeanisation of the 
St. Malo Agreement followed throughout 1999, very much helped by the 
renewed European experiences of concern and powerlessness during the 
Kosovo conflict.11 In this way the bilateral initiative became a European 
reality and changed the European defence identity into a European defence 
policy, the ESDP.12 
 
Along with the Kosovo experience, a number of institutional steps were 
taken at the June 1999 European Council in Cologne to make a European 
defence policy possible in practical terms. Among them was the creation of 
a new central body in the CFSP and ESDP, the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC). This consists of the ambassadors of the member states 
meeting twice a week, and often tends to be close to the political directors 
in these countries’ foreign ministries.13 Its purpose is to deal with all 
                                                 
10 St. Malo Declaration, 4 December 1998. http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.html#3 
11 Rieker, Pernille, From Territorial Defence to Comprehensive Security? European 
integration and the changing Norwegian and Swedish security identities. Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs, Working Paper Nr. 626, (2002) p.23. 
12 European Defence p.47. The ESDP also involves elements which cannot be discussed 
in detail in this chapter, for example the European cooperation in the defence industry. 
The “European Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, 
acquisition and armaments” is aimed at enhancing cooperation among EU members in 
this respect.  
13 International Crisis Group, EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited. Europe Report 
No 160 – 17 January 2005, Brussels. p.19. 
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aspects of CFSP and ESDP in order to manage developing crises, carry out 
planning work and advise the European Council. The role of the PSC 
would become particularly important in the event of any deployment of 
military forces from the Union, as it would then assume political control of 
the day-to-day direction of military operations.  
 
Another new organ was the Union’s most senior military body, the 
European Union Military Committee (EUMC), composed of the chiefs of 
defence staff of the member countries or their representatives, the task of 
which was to give advice and recommendations to the PSC. The European 
Union Military Staff (EUMS) in turn was established to provide expertise 
for the PSC, in particular in the conducting of a military crisis management 
operation. It was to be responsible for early warning facilities, situation 
evaluations and the strategic planning of Petersberg missions, and was 
regarded as constituting a source of technical expertise for the Union on all 
aspects of security and defence, and as acting as an interface between the 
political and military authorities within the Union.14 
 
 
The Institutional Birth of the EU Battlegroup Concept 
 
The Helsinki Headline Goal Process 
 
From words to deeds … or at least to more concrete words.  
 
In December 1999, just one year after St. Malo, the EU Helsinki Summit 
set out the ESDP process Headline Goal objectives. The aim was to place 
forces at the Union’s disposal that would be capable of carrying out all the 
Petersberg missions, including the most demanding ones, in operations up 
to the army corps level, i e 50 000 to 60 000 troops at 60 days’ notice. 
Member states undertook, by 2003, to deploy forces  
 
“Militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and 
intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and 
additionally air and naval elements, as appropriate. Member states 
should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and 
within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and 
deployable at a very high level of readiness. They must be able to 
sustain such a deployment for at least one year”.15 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 European Defence p.48. 
15 European Council, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions.  
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Efforts to build European forces in this quantity nevertheless soon ran into 
political, administrative and legal troubles in various member countries. 
Germany, for example, had severe legal constraints regarding the 
participation of its military in foreign operations. On the other hand, only a 
few EU countries had any capability for transferring troops to distant areas 
in any quantity.  
 
The next stage was to make up the shortfalls. The gap between what was 
required to meet the Headline Goal and the forces actually committed by 
member states was identified in the Helsinki Process Catalogue (HPC) of 
June 2001, which served as a basis for discussions at the Union’s 
Conference on EU Capability Improvement in November 2001, at which 
the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was launched. This Action 
Plan dealt mostly with procurement and structural or doctrinal initiatives, 
and therefore did not contribute directly to enhancing Europe’s crisis 
management capability. 
 
Another complicating factor was that many EU countries had earmarked 
the same troops for several pools and registers, i.e. besides being listed in 
the Helsinki Force Catalogue, the same units were also listed for use by 
NATO and the UN (in its High Readiness Brigade SHIRBRIG).16 One 
practical consequence of this situation was that no new capability really 
emerged with the Helsinki Headline Goal process, implying that the rapid, 
coordinated reaction required by the politicians would be an overwhelming 
task.17 
 
The shortfall in the Helsinki Headline Goal process serves as a key 
milestone as far as the Battlegroups are concerned, for although the 
Helsinki process was initiated to deal with the wider picture of European 
crisis management, it did not create any credible rapid response capability. 
There was no guarantee that the troops and resources listed in the Helsinki 
catalogues would actually be operational and available for rapid action in 
the case of an urgent need – they were just abstract commitments by 
member states, no more than names and numbers on paper. In other words, 
the Helsinki Headline Goal was a list of troops, but without any order of 
battle and in many cases without any history of joint exercises. In practice, 
Europe still had no capacity to react in a case of emergency.  
 
                                                 
16 At the same time the Nordic countries established a register and built up their 
capabilities for assembling a multinational Nordic crisis management brigade within the 
framework of NORDCAPS.  
17 Since then it turned out that the Helsinki Headline Goal was not achievable as 
planned by 2003. In October 2003, the EU foreign and defence ministers accepted that 
the Union could have the capacity to carry out the Petersberg tasks in all circumstances 
by 2010. 
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European Security Strategy 
 
Thus, notwithstanding the heightened consciousness among European 
decision-makers and the political developments described above, the EU 
still lacked a comprehensive approach to the security issues surrounding it, 
and its security policy aims were more or less unclear.18 On the other hand, 
there was a need for a roadmap, which would give a signal that the EU 
wished to be a credible independent security policy actor. After all, there 
was an obvious need among the member states to enhance their common 
security policy understanding as well as a common culture for crisis 
management. The European Security Strategy was created for these 
purposes. 
 
There was a clear sense of urgency behind the EU Security Strategy, 
caused by an increased awareness of the insecurity in the contemporary 
world, in particular the threat of international terrorism due to the 9/11 
incident in the United States and to worries about the way the U.S. would 
respond to that threat and the Union’s own expansion.  
 
The reaction of the U.S. government after the September 11th terrorist 
attack brought to the surface a difference of opinion between American and 
European security thinking that had perhaps already existed behind the 
scenes for some time. In this view, as also reflected in the U.S. Security 
Strategy of 2002, the Americans were regarded as having a higher 
propensity for resorting to unilateral military action once they estimated 
that their security was threatened. This seemed to imply that the Americans 
had distanced themselves from the multilateral approach deemed so 
important in Europe.19 
 
As time passed and the EU expanded during the late 1990s, and in 
anticipation of its major enlargement in 2004, the broader European 
security context also changed. The borders of the union were gradually 
moving closer to “security hotspots”, so that a secure environment on the 
other side of the Mediterranean, in North Africa, almost automatically 
became a matter of paramount importance, as also was the termination of 
the ongoing conflicts in the Balkans. Apart from these two, there were 
other obvious potential mission areas for the EU to be seen in the Southern 
Caucasus and the Middle East. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Although this was understandable considering the speed with which the ESDP had 
developed.  
19 On the U.S. Security Strategy, see www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ncc.html. 
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Although this is not officially stated anywhere, Africa is regarded as the 
main operational area for the European Security Strategy, and thus for the 
Battlegroups, too. This emphasis is of course natural in the sense that 
Africa is situated close to Europe and various emergencies there can easily 
have an impact on Europe as well. The African emphasis in EU crisis 
management efforts also fits into the division of labour between the 
security organisations, since NATO and the United States tend to be more 
interested in the Middle East and the CIS area. 
 
On the other hand, it could also be argued that Britain and France have a 
particular interest in Africa. Both of them happen to be former major 
colonial powers in Africa with considerable African populations in their 
area, and are thereby the most easily affected by emergencies in Africa. 
Britain and France also have substantial military resources and experience, 
especially regarding African countries. As a matter of fact, the other EU 
countries have a very limited amount of military power or know-how to 
add to these two countries’ capabilities regarding Africa. But politically, 
the other EU countries can make a big difference. International attention 
becomes essentially more positive if military operations are executed by 
the European Union rather than by these former colonial powers 
themselves, as they are still suspected by many as having dubious 
intentions with regard to various African countries. The fact that most of 
the manpower and expertise comes from the former great powers becomes 
less visible when it can be announced that the EU, as a whole or in part, is 
involved. 
 
The Security Strategy, which was first proposed by the High 
Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, at the Thessaloniki Summit in 
June 2003 and endorsed in Brussels in December of the same year, stated 
very clearly that the EU needed to be a more active international player, 
more unified and more able to take action.  
 
The document identified a number of risks and threats that needed to be 
taken care of. The key threats were terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional 
conflicts, state collapse and organised crime: 
 
“Taking these different elements together - terrorism committed to 
maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, 
organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the 
privatisation of force - we could be confronted with a very radical 
threat indeed.”20  
 
                                                 
20 Javier Solana, ”A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy”. 
Document adopted at the European Council, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 
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The strategy was based on three pillars: first, response to the global threats 
of terrorism, WMD proliferation and organised crime by recognising that 
the first line of defence now lies abroad; second, building security on the 
borders of Europe by consolidating stabilisation in the Balkans and 
extending economic and political cooperation to  neighbours in the south 
and east and remaining engaged in and committed to the resolution of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, which is a strategic priority; and third, upholding and 
developing international law, strengthening the United Nations Charter and 
building an international order based on effective multilateralism – a clear 
response to the American unilateralism as endorsed in their security 
strategy.21 
 
The doctrine also communicated the necessity for developing capabilities 
more systematically through cooperation between the member states, as 
well as a need for more flexible and mobile forces able to handle the new 
threats. The document gives a clear signal that EU capabilities and those of 
the member states need better coordination.  
 
With its insistence on more flexible and mobile forces to handle new 
security threats, the European Security Strategy serves as another direct 
prerequisite for the Battlegroup concept. 
 
 
Operation Artemis – the Battlegroup Concept Introduced 
 
The beginning of the war in Iraq caused a visible division among the EU 
countries over whether to support the U.S. policy there or not. 
Notwithstanding these divisions, which were perhaps given too much 
attention in the public eye, serious considerations about what the EU could 
do were going on in many member countries. 
 
Despite severe disagreement over the crisis in Iraq, efforts to improve the 
ESDP institutional settings and operational developments continued among 
EU member states. The most important development was that, after 
difficult negotiations, EU-NATO relations, which had to some extent been 
open to speculation, were firmly established with the “Berlin Plus” 
agreement in December 2002, in which it was agreed that the EU could use 
NATO planning support or NATO capabilities and assets for the execution 
of any operations. The agreement was a major practical step towards 
autonomous EU operations, since the EU did not have any such 
capabilities.22  
                                                 
21 European Defence, p.11. 
22 On the other hand, it also caused a political problem in the sense that NATO did not 
extend this agreement to countries which were not NATO members or involved in the 
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Simultaneously, political pressures towards some sort of rapid progress in 
the ESDP increased, and there was no objection to this being something 
concrete and high-profile. It was at this point that the predecessor of the EU 
Battlegroup concept came into the picture. 
 
The concrete development that was to produce the EU Battlegroup concept 
had its origins in the European military operation Artemis that sought to 
tackle the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo during the summer of 2003. Launched in June of that 
year, it was the first autonomous European crisis management operation. 
Although agreement on the availability of NATO resources for EU 
operations had been reached just a few months earlier, Artemis was 
managed outside the “Berlin Plus” agreement and beyond the continent of 
Europe. The decision to proceed with the operation was originally made by 
the French, and it was meant to be a French operation, but by the summer 
of 2003, it had become an EU operation.  
 
Basically, the story of Artemis was simple. The operation took place at the 
request of the United Nations and consisted of the deployment of an 
Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia in the Ituri region. The 
aim of the mission was to contribute to the stabilisation of security 
conditions in Bunia and to the improvement of the humanitarian situation, 
and to ensure the protection of the airport, displaced persons and the 
civilian population. EU forces numbering around 1800 troops from several 
EU nations, but mostly from France, which acted as a framework nation, 
stayed in the area until 1st September, to be replaced by troops under the 
auspices of the UN. Artemis was thus a very limited operation in terms of 
time, space and resources.23  
 
The completion of Artemis was greeted with satisfaction in the EU. The 
security situation in the area was restored, a large number of refugees were 
able to return and local militias were disarmed. The operation had also 
demonstrated that the EU decision-making and military planning organs 
were able to execute and finish a purely EU operation in a case of urgent 
need. It was also possible to interpret Artemis as a showcase of successful 
multilateral crisis management versus the simultaneous unilateral U.S. 
involvement in Iraq. 
 
Building on the success of Operation Artemis, the dynamic security duo of 
France and the United Kingdom, this time along with Germany, presented 
the “battle group” concept with a view to improving the EU’s capacity for 
                                                                                                                                               
PfP Process, with a security agreement with NATO. Consequently Cyprus and Malta 
are currently left out of the Berlin Plus arrangement. 
23 European Defence, p.63-64. 
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rapid reaction in February 2004. Two months later EU defence ministers 
approved the trilateral proposal, transforming it into a European initiative. 
According to this concept, battle groups, or “tactical groups”, of 
approximately 1500 troops, including the appropriate support elements, 
were to be formed ready for deployment within 15 days. They should be 
capable of high-intensity operations, either as stand-alone forces or as 
initial-entry forces for operations on a larger scale. Another feature of these 
groups was that they were designed to be either national or multinational, 
composed of troops from one or more member countries. In line with the 
European Security Strategy, these forces were designed specifically, but 
not exclusively, for use in response to requests from the UN.24 
 
Possible scenarios for these Battlegroups included support missions for the 
delivery of humanitarian aid, evacuation operations, conflict prevention, 
stabilisation operations and the separation of hostile parties.  
 
As the concept is based on small force packages, it significantly increases 
the flexibility and deployability of the Union’s armed forces, and as such 
constitutes an important step towards Headline Goal 2010. 
 
Even so, it was and remains just a step towards the final goal. Under closer 
scrutiny it is the political rather than military logic of the Battlegroup that 
becomes evident., It represents as such quite a modest military force, and in 
the final analysis it may not be an ideal tool for crisis management. The 
concept is clearly based on experiences from Operation Artemis and its 
future practicability remains questionable: nobody knows whether future 
crises will require similar force packages for a similar duration as in the 
Bunia area during the summer of 2003.25  
 
 
The EU Battlegroups: a Tool for Effective Multinationalism 
 
Much has been achieved in a remarkably short period of time. 
Institutionally, there are now three ways in which the Europeans can act in 
terms of crisis management: as part of a NATO operation, under the 
“Berlin Plus” agreement or in an autonomous operation with either a lead-
nation framework involving a national headquarters or a European 
headquarters. All these options are now on offer and have been agreed on.26  
 
                                                 
24 European Defence, p.59. 
25 Questions regarding the Battlegroups’ practical usefulness will be discussed in more 
detail in the articles by Mika Kerttunen and Tommy Jeppsson.  
26 European Defence, p.59.  
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As of 1st January, 2005, the Battlegroups are at their Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC), which means that from now on one Battlegroup will be 
continuously available for operations. Full Operational Capability (FOC), 
with two groups available, will be reached by 2007. 
 
Neither the Battlegroup nor the ESDP can serve as a nucleus for a 
European army, but it can be predicted that such a nucleus for a future 
European capability has already been created in the form of various ESDP 
politico-military institutions. It is also significant that there is no turning 
back with these new institutions. Essentially, these developments are taking 
place regardless of whether the future European Union Constitution will be 
accepted or not.27 
 
From a European Union perspective, the Battlegroup concept seems to be a 
step, although not yet a very big one, towards a more credible role in global 
security. As the above discussion has shown, its emergence is based on the 
idea that building up security on the borders of Europe requires a 
comprehensive approach that employs a wide range of tools. 
 
The European Union has already been a major player in world politics for a 
long time. It has had a wide variety of tools at its disposal, ranging from 
assistant programmes to police missions. Two member states are 
Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, and there are usually two 
others with membership on a rotating basis. The EU provides about 40 per 
cent of the UN’s budget, and it is the largest contributor of aid and 
economic assistance in the world.28 In other words, the EU is already a 
major provider of “soft security”. 
 
Militarily, however, the Union has traditionally been weak, or rather, non-
existent. The underlying logic behind the ESDP and the EU Battlegroup 
today is that the union simply needs better military capabilities in addition 
to its toolbox of other strengths. There are several reasons for this. 
 
First, in today’s insecure world, the European Union is composed of a 
number of states that are closely connected with the world’s economy and 
have strong interests in maintaining peace and stability all over the world. 
By themselves, however, the individual EU countries lack the necessary 
resources for this. A natural solution in this situation is to join forces in this 
effort. This need has become ever more urgent now that the union has 
expanded close to areas where poverty, instability and conflicts in all their 
forms are common. 
 
                                                 
27 See, for example, International Crisis Group, p.8. 
28 European Defence, p.20. 
 19
In this general aim for peace and stability the EU has common interests 
with the global superpower, the United States. In this sense the Americans 
are happy to see the Europeans taking more responsibility for global 
security issues, and this also applies to global and regional security 
organisations such as the United Nations. European armed forces that are 
stronger, flexible and more interoperable would also make the EU a much 
better partner for a number of other actors, including the U.S., the UN and 
various regional organisations.29 
 
In fact, “effective multilateralism” is a matter not so much of choice but of 
necessity for the Europeans.30 The failure to become involved early and 
effectively to protect others in the Balkans and Rwanda hung over the EU 
in the 1990s, and this interdependence between Europe and the rest of the 
world has only intensified during the last decade. It is a known fact that the 
EU states by themselves are not able to handle threats of the kind that are 
constantly emerging. If the EU fails today to become more effective in 
conflict prevention and management, it will ultimately be failing to protect 
itself.31 
 
On the other hand, the relationship with the United States is more complex 
than that, as the EU member states seem to be more committed to 
multilateralism than the U.S. In the final analysis the situation for the U.S. 
may well be the same, but at least the predominant thinking there has 
favoured the idea that, either by itself or with its allies, that country is in a 
better position and not so dependent on multilateral cooperation. In this 
sense, the EU Battlegroups were formed as a tool not just for crisis 
management but specifically for multinational crisis management, thereby 
constituting an indirect alternative to the unilateralist approach of the U.S. 
At all events, the uncertainty regarding future U.S. policies constitutes 
another reason for developing the ESDP and the Battlegroup concept. 
 
The EU Battlegroups can be seen as a message both for the external world 
and for the Europeans themselves. In the former case, the message is that 
Europe is determined to increase its capabilities and its role in crisis 
management. In other words, it is more willing and capable to tackle crises 
outside its own area, first and foremost in Africa, but in other areas as well, 
while an equally important message for the domestic European audience is 
perhaps that the ESDP is actually making progress and that concrete steps 
                                                 
29 International Crisis Group, summary. 
30 ”Multilateralism”  to refers to multiple countries working in concert as parties for 
some purpose. However, “multinationalism” is a more appropriate term to describe the 
functioning of organizations such NATO and the EU, whose member states are 
committed to common aims in a more general sense. 
31 International Crisis Group, p.3. 
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are being taken towards a credible European crisis management capability. 
That constitutes another reason for the above process. 
 
From the viewpoint of small EU member states such as Sweden or Finland, 
the big picture of ESDP and Battlegroup development contains mixed 
elements. On the one hand, the whole process is in their interests in many 
respects. By themselves they would not be able to tackle the numerous 
issues and problems that in any case affect their living conditions, and 
joining forces is practically the only way to pursue the “effective 
multilateralism” which they are so dependent upon. On the other hand, the 
process is a telling example of the relative position of small states in 
international affairs, including those of the EU, in that the concept was 
negotiated and agreed upon between just a few influential states, which are 
not particularly well informed about or interested in the individual 
aspirations of small nations, whose role then easily becomes one of 
adapting to requirements and concepts decided upon elsewhere. The rapid 
development of the Battlegroup concept can be seen in the light of the 
relationship between large and small EU member states as a way for the 
large states to induce the military in small states to accelerate their 
modernisation programmes and take a more active role in international 
crisis management. At the same time, the Battlegroup concept represents a 
general shift in emphasis in the dominant line of European defence thinking 
from territorial defence to international crisis management.  
 
To conclude, the EU has been very successful in the economic sphere and 
in enhancing stability and security in Europe. It is only on the threshold of 
becoming a “hard security” or military actor, however32. For time being, 
the Battlegroups represent quite a modest military force, which is not able 
to compete with the capabilities of the major powers, not even with that of 
most EU nations. It is also questionable whether the concept is an 
appropriate tool for crisis management in the first place. In addition, many 
questions remain to be solved, among them the proper mandate with 
respect to when to act, how to agree on the rules of engagement for each 
country’s representatives, how to transport the troops and equipment to the 
operation areas, questions of finance etc.  
 
It is probable that these obstacles will be overcome in due course, since a 
real political will now seems to exist among EU members to provide the 
organisational framework, with governments adopting a pragmatic 
approach and pressing for real military capabilities to be put in place. With 
                                                 
32 Hopkinson, William, Sizing and Shaping European Armed Forces. Lessons and 
Considerations from the Nordic Countries. SIPRI Policy Paper No. 7, March 2004, 
p.10. 
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this political will, the new tool of EU Battlegroups is about to proceed from 
the planning stages to a prototype level and to the first practical 
experiments.  
 
 
Four Theoretical Explanations  
 
Like any issue in international politics, the emergence and development of 
the ESDP and the Battlegroup concept can be approached and analysed 
from various theoretical perspectives. In fact, we cannot interpret the 
processes described in the above pages without recourse to theoretical 
models, however rudimentary or simple they may be. At least in 
international politics, we always tend to “see” the surrounding phenomena 
through theoretical lenses of some kind, whether we want to or not.  
 
In this way theories serve as a starting point for any research – they give us 
the tools with which to approach the world around us, provide ways of 
formulating questions about it and help to connect individual study to the 
body of existing research. Consequently, a researcher ought to be aware of 
the lenses, which he or she is using. Otherwise, the theories can easily lead 
only to confusion. 
 
The following is a sketchy interpretation of the ESDP process and the 
Battlegoup concept from four theoretical perspectives: liberalist, 
integration theory, political realism and geopolitical. These cases could be 
analysed from several other theoretical perspectives too, but this short 
excursion is meant to provide only an illustration of the connection 
between theory and practice in international politics.33 
 
A liberalist theory emphasises cooperation between states and non-state 
actors. The idea of democratic peace, for example, which is closely related 
to the liberalist theory of international politics, is based on the idea that 
democracies do not wage war against each other. Therefore democracy and 
prosperity, which it serves to advance, are regarded as tools for 
international peace. 
 
From this perspective, the above discussion is seen as a story of the 
European Union’s attempts to spread peace and democracy outside its own 
borders. It can be seen in this sense as a benevolent actor in world politics, 
seeking to bring peace, democracy and prosperity to its surrounding areas. 
It has done so during its history with the help of several enlargements and 
                                                 
33 For a concise guide to theories of international politics, see Lintonen, Raimo, 
Johdatus kansainvälisen politiikan tutkimukseen. Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, 
Strategian laitos, Strategian tutkimuksia N:o 9, 1996. 
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the various economic tools at its disposal. The ESDP and the Battlegroup 
concept can in this light be viewed simply as more robust tools for this very 
same purpose.  
 
Integration theory concentrates more on the internal EU dimension. It is 
based on the assumption that the logic of European integration is the 
driving force behind the development of the ESDP and Battlegroups, which 
are seen as natural consequences of the many preceding steps in the path of 
European integration, a process which is thought of as more or less 
unstoppable. Integration simply has a tendency to spread to one subject 
area after another. The EU started in the 1950s as an economic community 
with very restricted tasks, but since then integration has spread to new 
areas, and finally to defence issues.  
 
The realist perspective would, in a nutshell, emphasise the role of national 
interests. In this sense, a realist reader would ask what were the interests of 
the participating nations in their decisions to join these processes. In this 
regard, one way of interpreting the above developments would be to argue 
that European countries have found it beneficial to join forces. By 
themselves, they would easily be marginalised in world politics and be 
open to various security threats, but together, and with a credible military 
dimension, they can achieve a more secure and more substantial role in 
world politics.  
 
Somewhat related to the realist perspective is the geopolitical way of 
thinking, which emphasises control over resources or physical areas. In this 
sense it could be asked what are the geopolitical features of the most 
important European countries, or perhaps of the EU as a whole. It would be 
possible to argue, for example, that the present form of the ESDP is a 
compromise between the Atlantic orientation of Britain and the continental 
orientation of France. Since Africa has a prominent place in the ESDP, it 
could be argued geopolitically that Europe has thereby defined the 
continent as its “sphere of interest”.   
 
In this way the “reality” of the above case study can be interpreted 
meaningfully from various theoretical perspectives. Each provides a point 
of view, which does not explain everything but is not totally misguided, 
either. A single theoretical framework does not provide the whole picture 
of the ESDP or the Battlegroup concept, but rather one aspect of them. In 
this sense, theories serve as a basis from which to observe and explain the 
recent developments in European defence.  
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THE CONCEPT 
Mika Kerttunen 
 
 
Building the Concept 
 
The need for putting impetus to the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) and strengthening European crisis management capabilities was 
discussed in the Franco-British summit at Le Touguet in February 2003. 
The initial ideas discussed and the plans drafted received a more concrete 
form in another meeting in London in November 2003. In order to enhance 
the EU rapid reaction capability the countries proposed establishing a 
number of joint tactical groups – each consisting of approximately 1500 
soldiers. This proposal was endorsed by Germany in February 2004, and 
was as a trilateral proposal submitted to the EU Political and Security 
Committee the same month. The European Union Military Committee was 
asked to give its advice on technical aspects of the concept. A political go-
ahead was given by the informal defence minister meeting in Brussels on 
April 5th and 6th  2003.34 
 
The concept has its institutional roots in three arrangements within the 
ESDP: the Helsinki Headline Goal process starting in 1999, the European 
Security Strategy from December 2003, and Operation Artemis in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in summer 200335. The concept’s military 
rationality also stems from these arrangements. In the Helsinki Headline 
Goal process, the EU member states were committed to develop an EU 
rapid reaction force of 60 000 troops available at 60 days notice. The forces 
were to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks36, including the most 
demanding operations up to corps level. The forces “should be self-
sustaining with the necessary command and control and intelligence 
capabilities, logistics, and other combat support sources and additionally, 
as appropriate naval and air elements”37. The Helsinki Headline process has 
helped to set goals for the troops and nations (the Headline Goal 
Catalogue), to establish an EU list of available forces (the Headline Force 
Catalogue), and to identify the shortfalls between the two (the Headline 
                                                 
34 2590th Council Meeting General Affairs and External Relations, Brussels 14 June 
2004 (10189/04); Klaus Olshausen, “Das ”Battle Group”-Konzept der Europäischen 
Union“, Soldat und Technik, Mai 2004; Gerrard Quille, “’Battle Groups’ to strengthen 
EU military crisis management?“, European Security Review, Number 22, April 2003. 
35 Naturally the Treaty on European Union sets, though implicitly, the ultimate political 
goals and ambitions for the Battlegroup concept. 
36 Originally defined by the Council of Ministers of the WEU in June 1992 to include 
“[h]umanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peacemaking”.  
37 Presidency Conclusion, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999. 
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Progress Catalogue). At the end of 2001 the European Capability Action 
Plan (ECAP) was launched to remedy identified shortcomings in the 
Helsinki Headline Goal and find solutions to the most important 
deficiencies38. This was to be achieved by rationalizing member states’ 
defence efforts and increasing synergy between national and multinational 
projects. The first phase of the ECAP was concluded in May 2003. The 
ECAP focused mostly on procurement or structural and doctrinal initiatives 
and programs and thus not directly on enhanced crisis management 
capacity. At least the progress within the Headline process has been slow 
enough to make some nations accelerate the crisis management 
development with a new arrangement.  
 
The existing shortfall of the Helsinki Headline Goal process is though the 
quantitative goals were formally met in 2003 it actually did not create any 
credible rapid response capability. There was no guarantee that the troops 
and resources listed in the catalogues could have been operational and 
available in time for imminent implementation. As the International Crisis 
Group bluntly states on the failure of achieving the Headline Goal by the 
end of 2003 “The EU is a long way from having such a force, much less 
being able to project it approximately 4,000 km from Brussels that is its 
aim”39. 
 
In the European Security Strategy the European Union identified a number 
of risks and threats that need to be addressed. The document states that 
large-scale aggression against any member state is improbable. New threats 
that Europe faces are “more diverse, less visible and less predictable”. 
Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, 
state failures, and organized crime constitute the new threats Europe has to 
address. Cooperation with the United States and the EU’s own policies 
have contributed to the fight against terrorism and proliferation. Regional 
conflicts and the problems failed states are facing have been tackled with 
Union interventions. The new threats nevertheless require other than 
traditional approaches that have been based on self-defence. The first line 
of defence is often abroad, thus the EU “should be ready to act before a 
crisis occur”. The strategy links together the potential the EU has, 450 
million people, a quarter of world’s gross domestic product, with the 
contribution that has to be more active, more coherent and more capable. 
                                                 
38 Among those identified were e g attack helicopters, intelligence, surveillance, target 
acquisition and reconnaissance, in-flight refuelling, suppression of the enemy air 
defence, anti-missile defence, and strategic transport assets (Marc-André Ryter, 
Managing Contemporary Crises: A Challenge for the European Union, Department of 
Strategic and Defence Studies, Series 2 No 18, National Defence College, Helsinki 
2001, p. 16.). 
39 EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, International Crisis Group, Europe Report 
No 160, 17 January 2005. 
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All these three factors set demands for the general development of the 
European defence policies and armed forces as well as Battlegroup 
concept. The Union has to have capacity to act before severe crisis occurs. 
Engagement must be preventive. Several operations should be able to be 
sustained simultaneously. Forces need to be flexible and mobile. The scope 
is global, although special concern is given to the security of Europe’s 
neighbourhood.40 
 
Operation Artemis, or the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF), 
was only nominally an EU venture. The formal request by the United 
Nations Secretary General was made to France who then agreed to deploy 
one battalion to Bunia, North-eastern Congo41. France later expanded the 
request to the EU. The force was mandated in the United Nations 
Resolution 1484 “[t]o contribute to the stabilization of the security 
conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to 
ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the 
camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of 
the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian 
presence in the town”42. France was the framework nation, and sixteen 
other EU or non-EU nations participated in the force43. The first elements 
were deployed to Bunia on 6 June and full deployment was reached a 
month later. It should be noted that a UN Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (MONUC) had been present in the region since 
November 1999. This facilitated the deployment and some operations of 
the IEMF. The composition of the force provided the following strengths: 
 
- An airport of Entebbe’s quality enabled operational support 
- Special forces gave capability to engage and neutralize armed threats 
- The majority of the forces (French) were able to communicate with 
the local population 
- Intelligence capability was excellent 
- The use of air assets (lift, reconnaissance, strike) was effective 
- Field level unit hospital with surgical capacity44. 
 
                                                 
40 A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels 12 
December 2003. The Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) Javier Solana 
prepared the document.  
41 French Ministry of Defence, Operation Artemis. Lessons learned, CD-ROM, 
Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Library.  
42 The United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1484 (2003), 30 May 2003.  
43 The total force numbered 2130 personnel in the end of June and 1471 in the 
beginning of September, the force headquarters was located in Entebbe, Uganda and the 
operation headquarters in Paris.  
44 Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force, 
United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practises Unit, Military Division, October 2004. 
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Operation Artemis was an opportunity for the EU to show its capability to 
take action and operate autonomously. It enabled Member States to show 
their commitments to EU crisis management and Africa The goals set for 
the operation were, however, modest, and one can question the long 
perspective benefit of the enterprise no matter how positive the 
experiences. Minimally without MONUC the results would have been 
short-lived. The United Nations report criticizes IEMF on the strict 
insistence of the three-month deployment signalling the transitory nature of 
the force. It also shortened the period on the ground as it took time to first 
build up and to soon draw down; the force became fully operational 6 July 
and the first elements began to withdraw on August 1645. The report also 
states that the limited area of operations, the town of Bunia, pushed the 
problem elsewhere. The overall assessment is nevertheless positive. The 
IEMF restored security to Bunia and put an end to an immediate crisis. 
Most importantly it enabled the reinforced MONUC to deploy a robust 
brigade to take over and extend beyond Bunia.46  
 
The question remains to what extent the previous crisis are models for the 
developers of European crisis management capabilities. The Helsinki 
Headline Goals together with the crisis scenarios seem to repeat the 
experiences of the Kosovo campaign. The Battlegroup concept resembles 
the Operation Artemis in Democratic Republic of Congo47. Minimally, 
troop composition, modest tasks, limited area of operation, short 
timeframe, command and control arrangements and hand-over to a larger 
peacekeeping force sound familiar. Copying or modelling the previous 
operations is not necessarily wrong, but the problem lies with the fact that 
hardly any crisis mirrors its predecessors. It is essential therefore, that the 
EU crisis management arrangements remain flexible in order to meet the 
unexpected. Given the ambition to act on wide spectrum of crisis it is 
doubtful that a number of similar sized and of similar quality Battlegroups 
could tackle all situations. Yet, if there were groups of different size and 
quality, that is e g one infantry heavy, the second one amphibious, the third 
air-borne, this would provide too differentiated a capacity for the political 
masters. Needed in the future is for the first real capacity, not just a list of 
at least a brigade-size unit and for the second rapid and flexible capacity for 
minor incidents as well. The goals of the Council of Helsinki should be 
materialized. 
 
                                                 
45 French Ministry of Defence, Operation Artemis. Lessons learned.  
46 Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force, 
United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practises Unit, Military Division, October 2004. 
47 One should keep in mind that the idea of the Battlegroups was presented three months 
before the Operation Artemis began. This does not reduce the explanatory relationship 
and resemblance between the concept and the operation, but questions which one is the 
explaining factor. 
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In April 2004 Secretary General / High Representative Javier Solana 
proposed a methodology for developing the capabilities required, as well as 
a calendar foreseeing the setting up of Initial Operational Capability (IOC) 
by 2005 and Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2007. The Council 
approved the proposal in May 2004 and then integrated it into the Headline 
Goal 2010. This document outlines the aims and objectives in developing 
the overall EU military capabilities but also specifically provides political 
guidance for developing the Battlegroup concept. It continues the work 
started with the Helsinki Headline process but combines that with the 
objectives set in the European Security Strategy. The main focus is on 
interoperability, deployability and sustainability. In its May 17 2004 
conclusions, the Council recognized the need for rapid decision-making 
and planning. The EU ambition is to be able to make the decision to launch 
an operation within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management 
Concept by the Council. On the deployment of forces, the aim is to start 
implementing the mission on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU 
decision to launch the operation.48 They should be sustainable for 30-day 
initial operations, extendable to 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately49. 
 
A military Battlegroup concept was approved by the EU Military 
Committee in June 2004. The following aspects were emphasized and need 
to be further worked out (under the responsibility of the Military 
Committee): 
a. Within the scope of the Headline Goal 2010, the required number of 
Battlegroups will have to be defined; 
b. A Battlegroup Generation process needs to be developed as a matter 
of urgency; 
c. In order to be able to meet the IOC requirements by 2005, an interim 
solution for the Battlegroup provision might have to be utilized; 
d. The possible role of the Military Committee in the context of 
Battlegroup training and exercises could be developed; 
e. The issue of strategic mobility needs to be addressed; 
f. A detailed Roadmap with regard to the implementation of the 
Battlegroup Concept should be developed.50 
 
Priority was given to the development of the detailed military standards and 
criteria for the Battlegroups and to the establishment of the Battlegroup 
generation process, as most of the listed work depends on and is derived 
from these activities. In July the EU Military Committee tasked the EU 
                                                 
48 2582th Council Meeting General Affairs and External Relations, Brussels 17 May 
2004 (9210/04). The EU decision-making process in crisis management operations is 
described in more detail later in this chapter. 
49 Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2004 
(http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/82761.pdf).  
50 EU Battlegroup Concept (10501/04). 
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Military Staff to develop a roadmap describing all the areas discussed in 
the Battlegroup Concept including the timelines set for the concept. The 
Military Committee agreed upon the roadmap in January 2005 and 
submitted it to the Political and Security Committee. It covers in detail the 
process and procedures to achieve the Initial Operational Capability in 
2005, and outlines the general development to reach the Full Operational 
Capability in 2007. Within the already started Headline Goal 2010 work, 
the capability development process has led to a production of a new 
Requirements Catalogue containing also Rapid Response Elements. In 
order to avoid duplication of efforts with NATO, emphasis is given to the 
analogous standards, practical methods and procedures with the NATO 
Response Force. This requires cooperation and exchange of information 
between the organizations. One key issue here is the release of NRF-related 
documents to the EU by NATO. During the first half of 2005 issues such as 
the number of Battlegroups to be kept on standby, command and control 
characteristics at different levels of operations, standards and criteria, 
training and certification, and supporting logistic concept will be solved. In 
the first Battlegroup Generation Conference in May the Member States are 
expected to provide their initial offers for the next three and half years and 
their commitments for timeframe from one and half to three and half years. 
Detailed commitments are required for the timeframe from six moths to 
one and a half years. Ongoing processes include coordination with NATO 
(NRF) in issues of complementarity, with the United Nations in civil-
military coordination, and with Council General Secretariat on deployment 
of civilian EU instruments in case of a Battlegroup operation.  
 
The entire process from a vague political proposal to defined political and 
military ambitions took the EU machinery about one year. An additional 
year was required before the interim capacity was achieved. The “speed of 
light” development can be based on the institutional and political will to 
have something more concrete than a list of potential capabilities. The 
interim capacity for 2005 and 2006 relies on the existing forces and units of 
the bigger Member States. Reaching the FOC requires additional work on 
the EU and national level. 
 
 
Battlegroup: structures, material and performance 
 
Within the EU, Battlegroup is defined as a “[s]pecific form of rapid 
response. It is the minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, 
coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations; it can also be 
employed for the initial phase of larger operations. The Battlegroup is 
based on combined arms and battalion sized force, and reinforced with 
Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. A Battlegroup 
could be formed by a Framework Nation or by multinational coalition of 
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Member States. In all cases, interoperability and military effectiveness will 
be key criteria. A Battlegroup must be associated with a Force 
Headquarters and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as 
strategic lift and logistics”51. The European Union should have the capacity 
to undertake two concurrent single battlegroup size rapid response 
operations, including the ability to launch both such operations almost 
simultaneously.  
 
To make the concept more understandable certain military terminology 
should be explained. The term battlegroup itself raises some eyebrows, 
especially among those who are not familiar with the military terminology 
and those who want to oppose the idea of EU rapid response capability. 
Usually battle group refers to a standing naval group consisting of an 
aircraft carrier, surface combatants (i.e. vessels), and submarines operating 
under one commander. Land forces have traditionally been organized to 
permanent organizations of e g companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, 
or corps. A battalion is a unit consisting of usually 3-4 similar companies, a 
headquarter element and additional smaller supporting platoons and groups. 
As companies normally are about 80 to 150 troops strong, a battalion could 
be a couple hundred to several hundreds strong. A task force or a battle 
group in this respect, has meant a temporary or semi-permanent grouping 
of units, usually companies, under one commander for the purpose of 
carrying out a specific operation or sequence of a larger campaign. A 
classic example is the Finnish concept of task force / battle group 
consisting of an infantry battalion and an artillery battalion. With this 
temporary grouping of two separate arms, one was able to combine the 
speed of the infantry with the firepower of the artillery without engaging 
the more rigid and robust organization of brigade to the battle. The EU 
Battlegroup is similarly combined of different branches. This means that 
the group consists of a mechanised (infantry) battalion (3-4 companies), 
together with supporting units of different arms, e g engineers, air-defence, 
or fire-support companies or platoons. Combat support refers specifically 
to those units whose primary mission is to furnish operational assistance for 
the combat elements and which have their role fulfilling the combat tasks 
of a Battlegroup. Combat service support elements provide other than 
primarily operational assistance or functions. Their tasks include e g 
administration, maintenance, construction, medical services, and 
transportation. A fictional EU Battlegroup together with the Force 
Headquarter and the operational and strategic enablers could consist of the 
following units, elements and functions: 
 
                                                 
51 Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2004 
(http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/82761.pdf).  
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1. Force Headquarter including dedicated Staff- and Communication and 
Information Support and Augmented Staff 
 
2. Battle Group 
- Mechanized Infantry Battalion 
- Headquarters 
- Headquarters Company 
- 2 x Mechanized Infantry Companies 
- 1 x Light Infantry Company 
- Logistic Company 
- Combat Support  
- Fire Support Company/Battery 
- Engineer Platoon 
- Air Defence Platoon 
- Reconnaissance Platoon 
- Intelligence Platoon/Teams 
- Helicopter Support Unit 
- Combat Service Support 
- Logistic Company 
- Medical Platoon 
- Military Police Platoon 
 
3. Operational and strategic enablers 
- Air 
- Strategic Airlift 
- Tactical Airlift 
- Close Air Support 
- Air Port of Departure units 
- Sea 
- Strategic Sealift 
- Carrier Based Air 
- Sea Port of Departure units 
- Logistics 
- Combat Service Support 
- Equipment Support 
- Medical Combat Support 
- Other 
- Special Forces 
 
Given the high political profile Battlegroups possess, and the potential 
political and strategic implications of their activities together with the set 
stand-alone ambition, it is understandable that they are provided or 
supported with a vast number of highly sophisticated military units and 
functions. Essential for its success are: force commander’s or force 
headquarters’ command and control capabilities; accurate and integrated 
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intelligence; fire-power and force projection capacity; and force protection 
and medical service. Integrated intelligence and decision-making processes 
are a necessity for timely and accurate use of forces, tasking and targeting. 
Substantial firepower and force projection capacity not only help to achieve 
the tactical goals of a Battlegroup, but function as a deterring factors 
among lesser opponents. Given the political sensibility and potential 
vulnerability of a Battlegroup mission, a Force Commander is going to 
weigh the need of avoiding fatal casualties and the necessity to fulfil the 
tasks.  
 
With respect to the equipment and weapon systems the Battlegroups 
possess, the most effective are the infantry fighting vehicles / armoured 
personnel carriers with their mounted weapons. They can range e g from 
Hägglunds CV 90 series equipped with guns from 30 up to 120 mm calibre, 
to Mowag Piranha with a 30 mm gun to Sisu XA-180/200 series with a 
12,7 mm or .50 calibre heavy machine gun, a tactical air defence system or 
armoured piercing missiles like ITOW. Fire support units can be equipped 
with light field guns (howitzers) or 120 mm mortars. Even these relatively 
light weapon systems weigh well over 10 metric tons each. Each 
mechanised infantry company could have approximately 10-12 fighting 
vehicles and a fire support company/battery 6-9 field guns or mortar 
systems.  
 
The afore mentioned sustainability ambition of 30 days for initial 
operations requires that the EU has the ability to lift simultaneously both 
the troops and their materiel to the mission area. Battlegroups must have 
logistic capacity to handle the amount of materiel and supplies needed for 
the duration of the operation. By using sustainment requirements one can 
calculate the amount of materiel needed. The following table is based on 
the parameters used by the United States Army for their transportation 
planning52 and is intended to facilitate understanding on the logistical and 
transportation demands. The list of materiel is more illuminating than 
exhaustive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 US Field Manual 55-15 as in Jon von Weissenberg, Strategic Sea Lift Capacity in the 
Common European Security and Defence Policy, Department of Strategic and Defence 
Studies, Series 1 No 20, National Defence College, Helsinki 2002. 
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 Item Kg/man/
day 
Metric tonnes/ 
BG/30 days 
 
Class I Subsistence/Food/ 
Water 
3.2 
50  
144 
2250 
 
Arid areas 
Class II Clothing, individual 1.4 63  
Class III Petroleum, oil and 
lubricants 
0.23 10,3  
Class IV Construction 3.8 171  
Class V Ammunition - 10053  
Class VI Personal demand 1.5 67,5  
Class VII Major items 
-Vehicles/weapon 
systems  
 
-  
650 
162 
114 
 
25 * CV 90 (26 tn) 
12 * XA-185 (13,5 
tn) 
6 * AMOS (19 tn) 
Class VIII Medical supplies 0.3 13,5  
Class IX Repair parts - 30  
Total   1525 
3631 
Without water 
With water 
 
Table 1. Sustainment requirements for a Battlegroup. 
 
Deployment by air is naturally the fastest way of getting there. The set 10 
day ambition does not necessarily demand that the entire Battlegroup needs 
to be operational within the timeframe but that the execution of the 
operation begins by then. Technically airlifting a Battlegroup is possible. 
Americans for example deployed by air a light brigade of approximately 
2000 men with their materiel and equipment from the United States for the 
IFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It took four days and 288 C-17 
sorties54. In Operation Artemis 50 Antonov An-24, 20 Airbus 300 and 72 
C-130 Hercules sorties were needed to lift the ca 1500 troops strong force 
from Europe to Entebbe, Uganda, and from there on to Bunia, Congo an 
additional 276 C-130 sorties; the amount of materiel weighted 2410 tons55. 
Sealift can be used to deploy parts of a Battlegroup, to re-supply one or 
even to rotate the Battlegroups in some cases during the extended 120 days 
period. Yet, some of the conflicts do occur in landlocked states - far from 
potential seaports. Though not an intention or a wish to deploy two 
                                                 
53 The amount is deducted from the ammunition consumption of a brigade in a war-
fighting scenario (of 300 tonnes/brigade/day). A Battlegroup is about 1/3 of a brigade 
and its tasks are assessed to require 1/3 of the ammunition of the more demanding 
missions. For 30 days the amount is therefore (1/3 * 1/3 * 300 * 30) 100 tonnes. Class 
IX is similarly calculated (1/3 * 1/3 * 9 *30). 
54 European strategic lift capabilities – reply to the annual report of the Council, WEU 
Assembly Defence Committee, 5 December 2001. 
55 French Ministry of Defence, Operation Artemis. Lessons learned.  
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Battlegroups simultaneously, the EU ambition to conduct two operations 
nearly simultaneously nevertheless impacts strategic air and sealift 
capabilities. The need to have or reserve some capacity for the NATO 
Response Force does not ease the situation. Personnel could be airlifted in 
passenger aircrafts, but the airstrips must be held to higher standards. A 
specific Global Approach Deployability (GAD) process is therefore 
introduced within the European Capability Action Plan. It envisages the 
coordination of all strategic lift assets, mechanisms and initiatives in 
particular support of Battlegroup operations56.  
 
The main alternatives for strategic airlift capabilities are pooling, chartering 
or acquisition of capacity. By pooling the EU would try to use the exiting 
means more effectively. This would rely mostly on the Member States’ 
about 150 C-160 Transall (16 tonnes payload, 1800 km range) and some 
140 C-130 Hercules planes (19 tonnes, 3200-5000 km). The problem with 
this is their modest capacity. Another possibility is to charter Ukrainian or 
Russian An-124 Condor (120 to 150 tonnes, 5000 km) aircrafts. American 
aeroplanes like C-5 Galaxy (120 tonnes, 5200 km) or C-17 Globemaster 
(78 tonnes, 5000 km) could be available under the Berlin Plus arrangement. 
This alternative would diminish the claims of an autonomous EU capacity 
even further. The acquisition of larger Airbus A400 M aircrafts (payload 29 
tonnes) has been agreed upon, but first deliveries are not due until 2008 
with the last of the planned 80 to 200 planes in 2020. Despite the constant 
emphasis on strategic lift (particularly airlift capacities) it seems probable 
that the EU has to settle for ad hoc solutions, rely on American, Russian or 
Ukrainian assets or limit its crisis management ambitions before it obtains 
an autonomous capability in this field57. 
 
Sealift is by no means a simple solution, either. It requires specific carriers, 
access to a harbour or a suitable beach, and in case of land-locked crisis the 
units and materiel need to be deployed and transferred from the seaport to 
the area of operation. It is time-consuming but has an overwhelming 
transportation capacity. Technically sealift shipping falls into three broad 
categories: dry cargo ships (Ro/Ro) for the transportation of equipment and 
supplies, tankers for petroleum, oil and lubricants, and passenger ships for 
personnel and medical needs. To move an entire Battlegroup can be 
calculated to require some 17 000 m2 of deck space and 150 sea containers. 
                                                 
56 Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2004. 
57 EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, International Crisis Group, Europe Report 
No 160, January 17 2005. For details on strategic lift, see Jon von Weissenberg, 
Strategic Sea Lift Capacity in the Common European Security and Defence Policy, 
Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Series 1 No 20, National Defence 
College, Helsinki 2002. The Headline Goal 2010 stresses the importance of 
deployability at the core of the Member States efforts to improve their military 
capabilities. 
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One Ro/Ro ship is needed for the core battalion with the combat support 
elements and another one for the combat service support units and 
additional material and supplies. In case of amphibious landing, a half 
dozen amphibious ships58 are needed. Providing these vessels is not a 
problem for the Member States and their navies. The crux is the readiness 
of the ships and their crews, i.e. the time it takes to prepare and load the 
ships, steam to the area and unload the troops and material. Ro/Ro vessels 
can be expected to travel at an average of 20 knots and tankers at 12 knots 
speed.59 For such a task force a sealift of 4000 kilometres (2100 nautical 
miles) would then take seven to eight days. If the preparatory work does 
not take too long a time sealift theoretically speaking fulfils the 
requirements the EU has for the deployment. A combination of air and 
sealift would naturally provide a suitable and feasible solution for the EU.  
 
By the end of year 2004 Member States and Norway as a third State have 
committed to form the following thirteen Battlegroups: 
- France 
- Italy 
- Spain 
- United Kingdom 
- France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and potentially Spain 
- France and Belgium 
- Germany, the Netherlands and Finland 
- Germany, Austria and Czech Republic 
- Italy, Hungary and Slovenia 
- Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal 
- Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania   
- Sweden, Finland and including Norway as a third State 
- United Kingdom and the Netherlands60. 
 
During the Initial Operational Capability period of 2005-2006, the EU has 
ambition to have at least one coherent Battlegroup package to undertake 
one such operation. This capacity is provided by the United Kingdom and 
France during the first half and by Italy in the second half of 2005. In 2006 
Germany and France will commit joint Battlegroups and Spain, Italy, 
Portugal and Greece a multinational one. For 2007 and onwards the 
Battlegroups will be generated through EU Battlegroup coordination 
conferences. Even in Full Operational Capability the EU does not have the 
capacity of all 13 Battlegroups at its disposal but of two that are in 
operational tour of duty. In addition to the abovementioned commitments 
                                                 
58 Landing Platform Dock (LPD), e g Rotterdam class.  
59 Weissenberg (2002), p. 53-58, 64-69; European strategic lift capabilities – reply to 
the annual report of the Council, WEU Assembly Defence Committee, 5 December 
2001. 
60 Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2004. 
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several Member States have offered niche capabilities in support of the 
Battlegroups. Estonia has decided to participate and is to continue 
consultations with possible partners; Ireland is prepared to enter into such 
consultations.  
 
The participation of non-EU European countries and other country 
candidates for accession to the EU is in line with the Nice European 
Council Conclusions. For Sweden and Finland, Norwegian contribution to 
the joint Battlegroup was both politically and militarily most welcome. 
Achieving consensus in this issue among the Member States demanded 
thorough consultations. The problem was not Norway, but Turkey. Her 
potential participation and thus access to EU planning and decision-making 
was politically sensitive to Greece. Athens was ready to accept the 
principle, but wanted modalities for participation to have been “worked 
out” separately. At the end of day this reservation fell off, and other 
potential partners might be included to participate as well. The inclusion of 
a third State is to be done without prejudice to the rights of any Member 
State.  
 
By using different levels of military operations as levels of analysis one can 
examine the prospects and problems of the Battlegroup concept. Strategic 
level is commonly understood to focus on and set the political goals and 
ambitions of a nation, alliance or group of nations. Its goals are often long-
lasting and of wider scale. Operational level or operations fulfil the 
strategic goals by conducting operations or series of operations, campaigns. 
It uses the military power given and deployed by its highest political and 
military masters. Tactical level is about using or executing battles and 
engagements in order to fulfil the concrete military tasks set by the 
operational level.61 Problematic with the EU Battlegroups in this respect is 
that they are to serve the political and strategic level ambitions of the 
Union, but are of a size and capability of a tactical unit. Translating the 
political ambitions implicated in the European Security Strategy into 
concrete military objectives is vital for the whole ESDP. A major part of 
this work is conducted in the Headline Goal 2010 process, yet its focus is 
on wider-scale and long-lasting issues and thus not explicitly address the 
level-problematique facing the Battlegroup concept.  
 
                                                 
61 Clausewitz in his On War defined strategy as the use of engagements for the objects 
of war and tactical level as the use of armed forces in the engagement. The concept of 
operational level has been adopted in western military literature and doctrines during the 
post World War II years. Nations and organisations have different definitions of these 
concepts that also develop as policies and doctrines are reassessed and rewritten. Note 
also that the Franco-British initiative talked about joint tactical groups emphasizing both 
their advanced capabilities and limited size.  
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This theoretical contradiction can cause practical problems. The EU cannot 
limit her goals according to the tactical tasks of e g attack, defeat, capture, 
secure, protect or clear that a Battlegroup by definition is able to conduct. 
A Battlegroup cannot, on the other hand, overextend its capabilities to meet 
the general EU goals of building security, preventive engagement or crisis 
management even described in more concrete terms of e g hindering a 
genocide, or establishing conditions for peace.62 Some politicians are eager 
to speak about how the Battlegroups would hinder or stop genocides or 
ethnic cleansing. Rwanda and Darfur have been mentioned. Yet opponents 
capable of such large-scale violence could prove to be far too strong for an 
autonomous Battlegroup. A militia harassing, raping and killing civilians, 
hardly operates without governmental approval or support.  
 
Theoretically speaking the EU Battlegroups could participate in the 
following mission profiles: 
1) Expeditionary force. Either an autonomous or a joint operation 
(with NATO) to solve a limited size crisis.  
2) Entry force. An initial mission by paving the way to a larger 
operational size peace-enforcement or peacekeeping follow-on force. 
3) Emergency force. Supporting an existing (peacekeeping) mission by 
offering a robust capability to solve a local and limited size crisis. 
 
Of the scenarios elaborated within the Helsinki Headline Goal process, 
separation of belligerent parties by force is far too demanding. 
Peacekeeping requires a larger contingent and humanitarian aid is an 
unsuitable task for a battle group. Evacuation of (EU) nationals is within 
the scope but as such the task does not require the establishment of 13 
reinforced battalion sized units, neither do hostage situations. The remark 
on the Military Capability Commitment Conference’s Declaration on 
European Military Capabilities that “Battlegroups will be employable 
across the full range of tasks listed in the TEU Art. 17.2 and those 
identified in the European Security Strategy, in particular in tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management, bearing in mind their size63” is most 
relevant is this respect. Although Battlegroups are what the EU wants at the 
moment, is it what it really needs?  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Of the interplay between political ambitions, required forces and examples of 
required capabilities see Rob de Wijk, “Restructuring the Armed Forces”, in Martti 
Setälä (ed), Small States and NATO, Atlantic Council Of Finland, Occasional Papers No 
6, 2005. 
63 Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2004 
(http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/82761.pdf). 
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The abovementioned tactical performance limits the EU’s possibilities to 
use the Battlegroups in expeditionary type missions. Crises need to be 
severe enough to be pacified but not too demanding for a tactical size unit. 
The EU capability for autonomous action is limited by the modest military 
capacities it is getting in the coming years. This increases the need to have 
wider international support and participation for interventions. Thus the 
initial entry force and emergency force missions are most likely to be 
executed. Two primary partners in this respect are the United Nations and 
NATO. A regional or sub-regional organization, such as the African 
Union64 could theoretically deploy a follow-on force to continue a crisis 
management operation, too. Therefore the most severe concerns on the 
unilateral, offensive, “colonial or imperialistic” nature of the concept seems 
to be undermined by the very military modesty of the concept. The EU 
needs political partners and military support. Similarly, the scale of the 
Battlegroups concept, thirteen - 1500 troops units strong mean that they as 
such are no core of any European Army. Such ambitions or development 
could be identified if so wanted from the general ESDP development, and 
not from the Battlegroup concept. The Battlegroups have war-fighting 
capabilities but no capacity to fight wars!  
 
To highlight the differences between more robust and modest military 
effectiveness a comparison with the NATO Response Force is illuminating. 
Similarly to the Battlegroup Concept the NRF is a technologically 
advanced force including land, sea and air elements (joint), at high 
readiness, and multinational (combined). Its missions and size nevertheless 
differ remarkably from the EUBG. The NRF should be employable for the 
full range of Alliance missions from deployment as a show of force and 
solidarity to deter aggression, to deployment as a stand-alone force for 
Article 5 or non-Article 5 crisis response operations, to deployment as an 
initial entry force for a larger force. Its land component will contain a 
brigade size force comprising five battalions with requisite combat support. 
Emphasis is given to mobility as one of the battalion will be airborne and 
two will be air manoeuvre. The air component should be able to conduct up 
to 200 sorties (combat missions) a day. With a theoretical average of three 
sorties per plane per day this force should add up to 66 planes strong65. The 
maritime component will comprise up to a NATO Task Force size 
including a carrier group, amphibious forces, mine countermeasure and 
support vessels. It should be noted that the amount of the manoeuvre units 
is fivefold in the NRF - the air component of considerable size, and that 
even this size of a force is considered to be an initial entry force for a larger 
force. Naturally the effectiveness requirements set by the NATO Council 
                                                 
64 Though not directly linked to the Battlegroup concept the EU Action Plan for ESDP 
support to Peace and Security in Africa implicitly contributes to such cooperation.  
65 I.e. the size of the entire Finnish Hornet fleet (plus some additional support aircrafts).  
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stem from the larger and deeper commitments to the collective defence of 
NATO nations.  
 
The question of interoperability and duplication of efforts or 
complementarity with the EUBG concept is a question that can be readily 
solved as most nations already follow NATO based standards and 
procedures. A more severe and principled question to be solved is the 
organizations’ differing views on double earmarking or dual-hatting of 
forces to the NRF and EUBG. NATO does not want to take a risk that 
member states would withdraw their troops from the NRF due to other 
arrangements. The EU on the other hand does not want to freeze troops to 
any particular organization. NATO’s viewpoint is based mostly on military 
effectiveness and predictability. It however leads to certain duplication in 
those states that are members of both the EU and NATO. To avoid this 
requires nations to have two sets of rapid reaction forces - their tours of 
duties in both of the arrangements must be timed and synchronized. Similar 
synchronizing would enable the organizations to accept the EU viewpoint. 
A given national battalion could form the core of a Battlegroup at the time 
it is not earmarked to the NRF; given the need for rest, re-supply and 
retraining this does not look feasible. The EU wants Member States and 
NATO nations to retain flexibility and allocate their forces according to 
requirements. The EU fears the result of the inflexibility to be delays in the 
availability of forces, that one of the organizations renounces its rapid 
reaction capabilities or that forces are duplicated.  
 
 
Decision-making: structures and outputs 
 
The European Council of Helsinki in December 1999 decided to establish 
permanent political and military planning and decision-making bodies 
within the Council. After an interim period the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC, or the French acronym COPS), the European Union 
Military Committee (EUMC), and the European Union Military Staff 
(EUMS) were set up and established on Council decision on 22 January 
2001. Though established before the Battlegroup concept entered the EU 
agenda, these bodies and the chosen planning and decision-making 
procedures will be used in case of a Battlegroup operation. 
 
The Political and Security Committee has a key role in political control and 
strategic direction of crisis management operations. This is exercised under 
the responsibility of the Council. The PSC evaluates the essential elements 
like strategic military options including the chain of command, operation 
concept and the operation plan. The PSC will deal with all tasks defined in 
Article 25 of the Treaty on European Union. It consists of the ambassadors 
of the Member States, and particularly focuses on the following (to): 
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- Keep track of the international situation 
- Help define policies by drawing up ‘opinions’ for the Council 
- Monitor implementation of agreed policies 
- Provide guidelines for other Committees on issues within the CFSP 
- Send guidelines to the Military Committee.66 
 
In event of crisis the PSC is to deal with crisis situations and examine all 
the options that might be considered. This includes triggering the 
development of a draft Crisis Management Concept, proposing to the 
Council the political objectives to be pursued and the course of action to 
taken. The PSC has powers to amend the Operation Plan, the Chain of 
Command and the Rules of Engagement. The decisions on the objectives 
and termination of an operation remain vested in the Council.67 To achieve 
the political goals the cohesive set of options the PSC recommend to the 
Council plays an essential role. The PSC’s actual efficiency to take urgent 
decisions is questioned, as it might become too reliant on the military and 
strategic experts68. One can also expect that the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council (GAERC) consisting of the foreign and defence 
ministers would like to execute close political control in times of crisis or 
ongoing operations. Turf wars might also be waged with Committee of the 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the Commission and the 
Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). To 
avoid this the Council decision outlines the principles for intra-agency 
coordination, participation, liaison and information. The linchpin role the 
PSC has in planning and development of the Battlegroup concept or crisis 
management capabilities in general can not be underestimated.  
 
The highest military body is the European Union Military Committee. It is 
composed by Member State Chiefs of Defence, and represented by their 
military representatives. The committee is to give military advice to the 
PSC on all military matters within the EU and make recommendations 
based on military aspects. Its advice and recommendations include: 
 
- The development of the overall concept of crisis management in its 
military aspects 
- The military aspects relating to the political control and strategic 
direction of crisis management operations and situations 
                                                 
66 Council Decision of 22 January 2001setting up the Political and Security Committee 
of the European Union (2001/78/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities 
30 January 2001. 
67 As in both Operation  Artemis and Operation Althea (Council Joint Action 
2003/423/CFSP and Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP). 
68 Marc-André Ryter, EU Capabilities for Autonomous Military Crisis Management: 
Possibilities and Limits, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Series 2 Nr 11, 
National Defence College, Helsinki 2001, p. 17.  
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- The risk assessment for potential crises 
- The military dimension of a crisis situation 
- The elaboration, the assessment and the review of capability 
objectives 
- The military relationships with non-EU European NATO members, 
other EU candidates and other organisations, including NATO 
- The financial estimation for operations and exercises.69 
 
In crisis management situations the EUMC issues a Military Strategic 
Option Directive – an initiating authorization and guidance – to the 
Director General of the EUMS to draw up and present strategic military 
options. These options are then evaluated by the committee and forwarded 
to the PSC with its evaluation and military advice. After the Council’s 
decision on the military option, an Initiating Military Directive for the 
Operation Commander (OpCdr) is issued. As the Operation Commander 
has developed his or her Concept of Operations and Operation Plan, the 
EUMC provides advice and recommendation to the PSC. During the 
operation the committee monitors its “proper execution”.70  
 
The EU Military Committee provides military direction to the EUMS. The 
EU Military Staff performs three main operational functions: early 
warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning. These cover the full 
range of crisis management tasks71 and all cases of EU-led operations. This 
includes identification of European national and multinational forces and 
implementation of policies and decisions as directed by the EUMC. In 
concrete terms, the EU Military Staff plans, assesses and makes 
recommendations on the concept of crisis management and the general 
military strategy. In developing the EU crisis management capabilities, e g 
within the Headline Goal process, the EUMS elaborates, assesses and 
reviews the capability goals and further on monitors the training, exercises 
and interoperability of the forces made available to the EU by the Member 
States.72  
 
                                                 
69 Council Decision of 22 January 2001setting up the Military Committee of the 
European Union (2001/79/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities 30 
January 2001.  
70 Council Decision of 22 January 2001setting up the Military Committee of the 
European Union (2001/79/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities 30 
January 2001.  
71 The Petersberg tasks, which ought to be called TEU 17.2 tasks according to the 
Article 17.2 in the Treaty on European Union, together with the tasks of joint 
disarmament operations and support for third countries in combating terrorism and 
security sector reform as decided by the GAERC on 17 May 2004. 
72 Council Decision of 22 January 2001on the establishment of the Military Staff of the 
European Union (2001/80/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities 30 
January 2001. 
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In developing Battlegroups the EUMS has had a central task of producing 
the key documents, e g the Battlegroup Concept, preparing the meetings of 
various working groups, and cooperating with other bodies within the EU 
and other organizations, most notably NATO. With NATO the EUMS has 
established permanent relations of information exchange, harmonization 
and consultation. Regarding the planning and execution of crisis 
management operations, its main products are the security and risk 
assessments, concept of operations, military strategic options, and initiating 
military directive. It should be repeated here that the Operation 
Commander has the responsibility for the detailed planning of the 
operation, i.e. developing Concept of Operation and Operation Plan. The 
EUMS on the other hand also contributes to the non-military aspects of the 
military options.73  
 
The EU strategic planning procedure thus can be said to consist of four 
phases and it produces the following central documents for the mission: 
 
1. Crisis Management Concept (CMC) 
In the CMC the EU defines and decides the general execution of a crisis 
management operation. The document is prepared by the General 
Secretariat of the Council, the EUMS representing the military expertise, 
and is approved by the Council. It contains an overview of the situation 
based on a Security and Risk Assessment (SRA), and outlines of the 
operation. The use of all resources, military and civilian, is essential here74.  
 
2. Military Strategic Options (MSO) together with a possible Council 
Joint Action 
The Military Committee assigns the EUMS to develop Military Strategic 
Options according to the decided CMC. MSOs translate the PSC request 
into military terms. They include an assessment of risks and feasibility, a 
command and control structure, force capability requirements together with 
an indication of possible available forces and recommendations regarding 
an Operation Commander, an Operation Headquarter, a Force Commander 
and a Force Headquarter.   
The Military Committee gives its military advice to the Political Security 
Committee, which evaluates the options and submits a draft decision to the 
Council. The Council finally chooses the option to be followed and 
appoints the OpCdr and designates the OHQ and FCdr. 
 
                                                 
73 Council Decision of 22 January 2001on the establishment of the Military Staff of the 
European Union (2001/80/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities 30 
January 2001. 
74 Simultaneously to the military planning the use of civilian and police resources is 
planned by the Council Secretariat, evaluated by the CIVCOM and decided by the 
Council. 
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3. Initiating Military Directive (IMD) 
After the Council decision on MSO the PSC sends guidance to the EUMC 
to direct the EUMS to develop an Initiating Military Directive - a planning 
directive for the Operation Commander. The IMD is approved by the PSC 
before its release. 
 
4. Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Operation Plan (OPLAN) 
together with the decision to launch the operation 
The Operation Commander prepares CONOPS and OPLAN, which are 
evaluated by the EUMC and the PSC. The Concept of Operations and the 
Operation Plan describe in detail the execution of the mission. The use of 
force together with timing and sequencing are critical elements to be taken 
into account. The Council approves the documents. 
 
In table 2, a simplified flowchart of the EU military crisis management 
planning and decision-making process is presented. It focuses on the 
outputs the different political and military bodies produce.  
 
 
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Military crisis management planning and decision-making within the EU 
bodies75. 
 
75 Adapted from the Council decisions 2001/78/CFSP, 2001/79/CFSP and 
2001/80/CFSP, Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis 
management, Politico-Military Group (6601/03) 20 February 2003 and Lars Wedin, 
”Tre år i EU:s militära stab”, Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och 
Tidskrift, 1/2004, pp. 119-153. 
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The described planning and decision-making process contains several 
critical vulnerabilities. The procedure can be time consuming. Though 
initial information and directives are given, the formal steps take time. The 
ambition of the EU is to be able to make a decision to launch an operation 
within five days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the 
Council76. Without proper empirical evidence it is too early to say which 
phase or output is the most crucial one.  
 
For the Operation Artemis in 2003 the planning within the EU began on 
May19 when the GAERC requested the SG/HR to study feasibility of a 
European Union military operation. The Council adopted the decision to 
take action (Council Joint Action) on 5 June.77 The EU OPLAN was issued 
by the Operation Commander and sent to the EUMS on 8 June; it was 
revised by the EUMC the next day. Force generation conference was held 
on 9 June. The operation plan including rules of engagement was approved 
on 11 June. The decision to launch the operation was taken on 12 June.78 
What is significant to Artemis is that some of the forces began their tasks 
before the operation was formally launched79. In the Operation Althea the 
General Concept for an ESDP Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including a 
Military Component was approved on April 22, the Military Strategic 
Option on May 28 and the IMD release approved on June 28, 2004. 
Council Joint Action was taken on 12 July80 and the operation was 
launched on December 2, 2004. Althea naturally does not resemble 
potential Battlegroup operations, but it illustrates well, how much time 
planning, decision-making and implementation can take.  
 
One could suggest that the earlier phases, which launch the process and 
decide on political preferences and goals would be more time consuming 
than the later ones, concentrating more on the military implementation of 
the operation. This does not, however, mean that the political decision-
making as such would be slow but that potentially conflicting interests 
appear more on the political level than on the military one81. The decision-
within-five-days-after-the-CMC-approval ambition seems feasible if the 
time is reserved to develop and select the Military Strategic Option 
                                                 
76 2582th Council Meeting General Affairs and External Relations, Brussels 17 May 
2004 (9210/04).  
77 Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP 5 June 2003.  
78 French Ministry of Defence, Operation Artemis. Lessons Learned.  
79 French reconnaissance elements were deployed already in May, forward elements 
arrived to Bunia on June 6, and the first combat troops entered the town on June 10, 
2003.  
80 Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP 12 July 2004.  
81 Also here one should keep in mind what Isaiah Berlin once observed on political 
debates, that fundamental disagreements about political and moral ends have been 
displaced by technical disagreements about means (Michael Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin, A 
Life, Vintage, Reading 2000, p. 198.). 
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(together with the Police Strategic Option and the Civilian Strategic 
Option) and take Council Joint Action. If the Initiating Military Directive 
and the Concept of Operations together with the Operation Plan need also 
to be developed and approved within the timeframe the goal is ambitious. 
Shortcuts are needed to ensure parallel planning. Processes like Headline 
Goal 2010 and the Battlegroup coordination conferences, which seek to 
ensure states’ commitments to crisis management help to remove some 
issues from the political agenda of the day. Member States do not need to 
debate e.g. which Battlegroup would be sent or who would participate as 
these issues are to be decided beforehand; that is in 2005. Harmonization, 
technical standards and standardized operational procedures help to 
decrease the number of open military issues. Institutional measures to 
streamline decision-making are to be considered in near future. The SG/HR 
Javier Solana has come up with a report on “accelerated decision making 
and planning process for EU Rapid Response Operations” as requested by 
the GAERC on 17 May 2004. In his mid March 2005 evaluation Solana 
underlines the need to simplify the procedures. The proposals focus on two 
steps: the advance planning prior to approval of the CMC, and operational 
planning prior to the Council decision to launch an operation. Advance 
planning should follow the procedures and lessons learned from Operation 
Artemis, i.e. to form a crisis response coordination team and utilize a task 
force format in planning. The basic documents needed like the draft Joint 
Action or the draft Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) should be prepared 
simultaneously with drafting the CMC. Also the draft CMC and the draft 
OPLAN would be prepared simultaneously and the OPLAN finalized, 
considered and approved within the following 5 days. This would shorten 
the procedures by skipping Military Strategic Options and the Concepts of 
Operations altogether. Steps could be abandoned also by joint or concurrent 
sessions of the PSC and the EUMC. 
 
One major question is left open in the decision-making structure and it gets 
the SG/HR’s attention. The EU does not have a permanent Operation 
Headquarters. The question of a standing headquarters was debated in 
spring 2003, but such a capability independent of NATO was not 
acceptable to Britain. Instead crisis management operations will be led 
from one of the designated operational headquarters provided by Germany, 
France, Italy and Britain. The EU has, however established a permanent 
cell at the SHAPE82 for operational planning of EU-led operations using 
NATO assets under the Berlin Plus arrangement83. By January 2006 an 
operations centre to plan and conduct ESDP operations on the scale of 
Operation Artemis will be established. The centre will not replace the need 
                                                 
82 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, NATO headquarters located in Mons, 
Belgium. 
83 Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina is led from there. 
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of an OHQ but will rather ensure planning capability before an OHQ is 
designated.84 At the moment no detailed mission planning can begin before 
the Council has decided which headquarter will be the Operation 
Headquarter85. The lack of a standing OHQ leads to the loss of institutional 
memory as the dedicated headquarters inevitably will rotate in tour of duty. 
The lessons learned at the military strategic – operational level might be 
hard to transfer from one place to another. It is probable that the EU will 
establish a standing operative headquarter in a few years time. This would 
ensure faster and parallel planning. The problem is partly solved within the 
Battlegroup concept as the rotation cycle will facilitate the identification of 
the future OHQ.  
 
In addition to the functional planning and decision-making process, clear 
and defined command and control relations between the participants are 
important. Several potentially conflicting interfaces exist within the EU. 
The strategic planning and decision-making system within the second 
pillar, Common Foreign and Security Policy, headed by the Council and 
run by the established bodies seems to work. The actors are finding their 
roles and the procedures are developed86.  
 
The Council however is not the only player in crisis management. The 
European Commission also has its say – and resources. The Commission 
may refer to the Council any question relating to CFSP as well as submit 
proposals. It can make suggestions to the Policy Unit for work to be 
undertaken. Its influence is mostly based on managing the CFSP budget, 
focusing on long-term structural issues and immediate humanitarian needs 
that can contribute conflict prevention and management and on the 
numerous instruments it has at its disposal.87 By using rapid reaction 
mechanism the Commission is able to mobilize civilian resources within 
hours. The mechanism allows grants to governmental agencies, 
international organizations, non-governmental organizations and public and 
private operators. It covers situations of crisis, emerging crisis, threat to 
law and order, security and safety of individual, and situations threatening 
to escalate into armed conflict or to destabilize a country.88 The 
Commission is active in all phases of the crisis management planning. In 
the crisis build-up phase the Commission participates in on-going situation 
                                                 
84 European Council Conclusions, 17 and 18 June 2004. 
85 Wedin (2004), p. 138-139. 
86 The SG/HR presented his report on EU Crisis Management Procedures and decision-
making in March 2005. 
87 Common Foreign and Security Policy, www.europa.eu.int/comm/external 
relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm; EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, International 
Crisis Group, Europe Report No 160, 17 January 2005. 
88 Council regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction 
mechanism, Official Journal of the European Communities 27 February 2001.  
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and risk assessments. During the afore mentioned crisis management 
planning and implementation, the Council invites the Commission to 
submit proposals, adopt its measures, direct, re-examine or redirect its 
action towards the objectives and priorities set by the Council decisions. 
The Commission for its part presents and keeps the PSC informed about 
the measures under preparation, taken or envisaged.89 COREPER for its 
part controls the political agenda of the intergovernmental affairs. It is an 
ambassador level forum for dialogue, negotiation and the assistance of the 
Council. It approves the CMC, Joint Action, OPLAN and Rules of 
Engagement before they are dealt and approved by the Council. The PSC 
chairman’s participation in COREPER’s work when necessary helps the 
more institutional PSC-Secretariat axis to understand what is politically 
feasible. It should be noted that COREPER is to maintain its role even if 
the SR/HG proposals are adopted. The terms of ends, ways and means are 
used in strategic studies to analyze actors’ political and strategic choices. 
One can similarly question whether the different bodies within the EU have 
the same ends, understand the need for comprehensive and complementary 
ways to achieve them, and can actually coordinate the political, civilian, 
financial, police and military means that are at their disposal.  
 
One essential body of documents are the Rules of Engagement (ROE). 
Rules of engagement provide guidance and instructions to decision-makers, 
commanders and troops at all levels on the degree and manner in which 
force may, or may not, be applied. ROE operate within the framework of 
existing political directives, legal considerations and the requirements of 
the mission. Their functions are to provide political guidance, to ensure 
political and juridical control, to define the limits of operative action and to 
define personal responsibilities of all the involved personnel. Though often 
considered just a limit to freedom of action, ROE can be seen to grant 
authority to an act by legitimizing beforehand certain behaviour and 
procedures. It should be noted that the right of self-defence is inherent and 
not compromised by ROE. The problem lies in defining and interpreting 
the conditions for self-defence. ROE cover reactions to perceived hostile 
intent as well as hostile acts. The latter is easily identified, but the former 
needs sound interpretation. Soldiers in the field face situations where their 
decisions have fatal consequences.  
 
The commanders of the current peace support or crisis management 
operations have often faced situations where some contingents, due to 
limiting national legislations, cannot be used for all tasks. Some cannot 
participate in peace enforcing operations and some cannot be used in riot 
controlling. This cannot be the case for the Battlegroups. The Member 
                                                 
89 Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management, 
Politico-Military Group (6601/03) 20 February 2003. 
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States need to harmonize their national legislation and ROE in order to 
guarantee preplanning, training and the actual conduct of the tasks defined 
by the EU. 
 
The EU has defined in its Use of Force Compendium that the response 
must be commensurate with the threat posed, and the damage it may cause; 
it also must be limited to the degree, intensity and duration necessary to 
eliminate the threat. For Operation Althea, the EU Council authorized ROE 
that permit: 
- The right to stop, search and seize 
- The right to detain 
- The right to establish and restrict access to secure areas 
- The right to use force to: 
1) Defend friendly forces, persons with designated special 
status, and property with designated special status 
2) Conduct mandated military operations 
3) Prevent serious crimes 
- The right to intercept and divert or engage aircraft when 
authorized90. 
 
Similarly the use of force up to and including deadly force may be 
authorised. ROE regarding any given Battlegroup operation would be 
considerably more robust and complex, but even the simplified list offers 
an illustrative overview of the areas to be tackled.  
 
The more complex the operation, the more complex ROE are needed. 
Different levels of operation and different services must have partly 
specified ROE. A commander needs rules that guide his or her planning 
and decision-making, e g which objects are allowed targets and which 
means can be used against them. A lance corporal needs guidance for his or 
her behaviour on the ground, e g when and how to use force against a 
suspected target. Air and maritime forces use weapon systems that can 
cause formidable damage - what might be legally possible might be 
politically impossible. Airspace and international waters are also regulated 
by international law, which must be taken into account in the ROE. Troops 
that operate in or from a third world country need their own rules. 
 
Rules of Engagement will be defined separately for each and every 
operation. Effective ROE result from a development process that is 
integrated throughout all phases of planning. The process of ROE 
development with the EU crisis management planning process is as 
follows: 
                                                 
90 Use of force principles and rules of engagement. Appendix 3 to Annex E, Dated 11 
October 2004. Declassified and authorised to release page.  
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- In developing the Concept of Operations the OpCdr/OHQ describes 
the appropriate use of force in broad statements 
- After the Council has approved the CONOPS more detailed 
operational planning begins at the OHQ and the FHQ; the use of 
force annex to the OPLAN contains statements on self-defence and 
mission-specific direction and guidance to the Force Commander for 
implementation, interpretation and application of authorized ROE 
- After the Council has approved the OPLAN, the OpCdr sends a 
formal ROE Request to the Military Committee 
- Council after the advice and recommendations of the EUMC issues 
an Execution Directive, and the MC sends an ROE Authorization to 
the OpCdr 
- OpCdr issues a ROE Implementation Message to the Force 
Commander and he or she further on the troops. 
 
To summarize, the Operation and Force Commanders draft the ROE 
according to the political and juridical guidance given by the Council/PSC. 
The political decision-makers bind and commit themselves to the 
implementation of the operation and the ROE by officially approving them.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Need for crisis management is obvious. It is as clear that the EU wants to 
develop its capability to contribute to peace and stability in its 
neighbourhood and globally. Unclear, however is whether the Battlegroup 
concept is the right answer for the existing and expressed desires. 
Battlegroup as such is a state of the art tactical level battle formation but 
there exists a performance gap between the desired political impacts and 
the military execution. Suitable tasks that are politically important and 
militarily feasible might be hard to detect. What does it tell about the 
political ambitions and the military reach of this economic giant of ours if 
we are deploying expeditionary forces here and there for minor duties and 
for a relatively short period of time? Actual effects might be limited, and to 
deploy the troops requires external support or resources. An autonomous 
capacity awaits itself. Therefore wider international political support and 
military contribution is needed for most ambitious Battlegroup missions. 
Initial entry force missions and limited contributions to on-going operations 
are the most likely and the most suitable mission types for the moment.  
 
A question therefore arises: should the EU concentrate on developing a 
more robust capacity to meet the demands of the day? What the EU really 
needs is a “Helsinki Headline Goal – director’s cut”, the original version of 
robust crisis management capability not previously distributed and which 
everyone has heard of but no one has seen. All credit to the civil servants 
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and military personnel who work hard to fulfil goals set for the 
Battlegroups and for whom some may sacrifice their lives in Battlegroup 
operations, but does the Emperor have new clothes at all? 
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SWEDEN - A Framework Nation in Transition 
Tommy Jeppsson 
 
 
As this chapter has focus on Sweden as framework nation of the Nordic EU 
Battlegroup (BG), the author is fully aware of the risk not to deal enough 
with other contributing countries. Reason is simply that the Swedish 
contribution represents the main body and therefore is the natural base for a 
presentation of the more overarching security and defence policy 
background, as well as giving facts and figures connected with the concept. 
In the next chapter Finland is discussed with a consequence that especially 
Norway is not covered sufficiently and Estonia is not covered at all. On the 
other hand, the final part of the chapter is, from a more general point of 
view, reflecting over and discussing the probabilities for future change in 
the BG concept generally, as well as the Nordic one. It has to be observed 
that the word “Nordic” is used despite the fact that Denmark and Island not 
are participating in the project.  
 
Denmark has made a reservation in the Amsterdam treaty not to participate 
in any activities involving EU military capabilities. Consequences are that 
if UN tasks EU to launch an operation or if EU takes the decision to go for 
an operation by itself, or if NATO goes for an operation where USA is not 
participating and the European countries uses the EU defence dimension, 
Denmark might find herself in a situation where the country is unable to 
participate91. Especially for the discussion taking part in the final part of 
this chapter it is estimated that Denmark will change this point of view in 
the future. 
 
 
A rapid political process 
 
In the work for preparing the Swedish defence decision, taken in December 
2004, the government stresses the importance of participating in the 
development of EU crises management capabilities, including the ability 
for rapid reaction. In order to improve the defence forces for more 
demanding international operations, priority is given to the development of 
a European rapid reaction capability92. The establishment of a Nordic BG 
together with Estonia, Finland and Norway, with an option from 2010 – 
                                                 
91 Nordisk Sikkerhet - Militaerbalansen 2003-2004. Den Norske Atlanterhavskomité, 
Oslo 2004, pp. 66-27. 
92  Proposition 2004/05:43, Försvarsmaktens grundorganisation. Regeringskansliet, 
Stockholm 2004, p. 16. 
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2012 to organize a national Swedish BG 93, is regarded as the “main-focus-
project” within the Swedish armed forces in the coming years. 
 
The process of developing a Nordic multinational EU BG, in order to 
participate in the enhancement of the EU crises management capabilities, 
represents a landmark in the rapid shift of Swedish security and defence 
policy. In reality, military non-alignment, does not exclude Sweden to 
cooperate military with other nations in all types of Crises management 
operations, while at the same time the formal membership of a military 
alliance is politically a non-subject. As an example, support related to 
Command and Control for the Nordic BG, is expected to be provided by 
United Kingdom through its Operation Headquarters (OHQ). From the 
Swedish perspective such an arrangement would have been highly doubtful 
only a decade ago. Also the timeframe of establishing the Nordic BG gives 
interesting signals. The BG will be operational from the first of January 
2008, which clearly indicates a political willingness of showing practical 
results in shortest possible time. This is the practical output of the fact that 
the ability to participate in international missions in the short and midterm 
timeframe is the most important single factor that influences day to day 
work in the armed forces94.  
 
In the first chapter in this publication, the very fast process regarding the 
growth of EU as a security policy actor and the development of EU military 
capabilities is discussed. In this section, focus is the narrower national 
perspective. It gives a short overview of the development of the Swedish 
security and defence policy in 1999–2004. This period has seen a more 
dramatic change regarding security and defence policy than maybe ever in 
the modern history of Sweden, and these are closely knitted to the 
development of ESDP. When the Nordic EU BG is discussed, it is essential 
to have this national perspective, bearing in mind the Swedish role as 
framework nation.    
 
Main characteristics of Swedish security in 1945–1990 are covered in the 
words neutrality and non-alignment. A credible defence policy, a 
reasonable strong total defence organisation, conscription and a national 
defence industry were cornerstones for the ability to handle a threat that 
was entirely military. We now face a situation where almost all militaries in 
Europe, in less than two decades since the end of the cold war, have seen 
deep-going transformations in order to meet new and broader challenges. 
This has resulted in substantial reductions in numbers but at the same time 
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troops deployed in missions abroad between 1990-2004 has been 
doubled.95  
 
The fundamental change in the security policy environment influencing 
Sweden, which is as a result of events taking place from the mid 1980’s 
and in the beginning of the 1990’s, has resulted in giving up neutrality, and 
non-alignment has turned into military non-alignment, while Sweden at the 
same time gained membership in EU in 1995. As a result of participation in 
the Partnership for Peace program, Swedish cooperation with NATO has 
intensified, which has been a booster for the transformation process of the 
armed forces. 
 
Starting slowly in the early 1990ies, accelerating in the late 1990íes and 
reaching top speed after 2000, the Swedish armed forces has undergone a 
dramatic reorientation from a threat focused territorial anti-invasion force 
towards a crises management instrument to be used internationally as well 
as domestically. One main driving force has been the ESDP process, in 
which Sweden has participated very actively. One reason to that obvious 
positive attitude towards ESDP is that Sweden has shown a genuine interest 
to increase the crises management capabilities of the union. On the other 
hand, another, more covered, reason might be the Swedish resistance 
against a common European defence96, which might explain the effective 
Swedish EU presidency in 2001, also when security issues were on the 
table. One example of effectiveness mentioned, is the organisation of the 
military capabilities work. The most important procedural result of the 
Headline Goal process, the Headline Progress Catalogue (HPC) was a 
Swedish idea, in which document it is clearly stated which capabilities the 
EU requires, which ones are operational and what operational 
consequences identified shortfalls will have97.  
 
This work is estimated to have had high influence on the restructuring of 
the Swedish armed forces. First, Sweden committed units from all services, 
which were reported to HPC, with high costs associated to the work needed 
to make them interoperable as well as meeting required status of readiness. 
Second, and of significant importance was the show of political willingness 
as well as ability to participate in EU operations. Operation Artemis in the 
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Democratic Republic of Congo, where a Swedish Special Forces unit was 
operating in close and effective cooperation with French units, has had 
positive spill-over-effects regarding how the Swedish military is viewed 
internationally. Third, decision taken by the Swedish government to 
participate in Operation Artemis has shown an ability to take sensitive, 
security policy related, decisions in short notice, as well as an increased 
willingness to use the military instrument as a security policy tool, which 
also represents something fundamentally new compared with the cold war 
period. 
 
The political process as well as work done in the Swedish armed forces HQ 
before and after the parliamentarian decision, regarding the defence white 
paper 2004, seems to confirm an ongoing tendency during the last years 
towards more focus on the unions military dimension, also in countries that 
traditionally has shown reluctance in the use of the military instrument. EU 
requirements seem to be the most important single factor when it comes to 
the implementation phase of the restructuring, which in fact is the same as 
having focus on the establishment of a Nordic EU BG, operational in less 
than three years98. ESDP seems to be the “way forward” for the 
restructuring process and half a year before the Swedish defence decision 
in December 2004, the EU BG concept was implemented and Head Line 
Goal 2010 was developed99. The result is that EU is affecting both Swedish 
security policy as well as further development of the armed forces and it 
has to be underlined that progress inside the union concerning development 
of substantial crises management capabilities, serves as a motor for change 
also on the national level.  
 
The influence of EU upon its Member States, including Sweden, could be 
estimated to increase as a consequence of positive results in the ESDP 
process, which has been reached in a remarkable short time. For Sweden as 
a small state, the development of security policy hardware, like the Nordic 
EU BG, is a way of showing political willingness to support the ESDP 
process and at the same time a way of gaining influence over its further 
development which. Part of that political influence might be used to 
continue to oppose a closer European defence identity. However, the 
creation of a Nordic EU BG will most probably, from practical military 
aspects, deepen the interaction with participating countries in a wider area 
of defence related issues. Interesting is that this cooperation will include 
United Kingdom. Bearing in mind the specific role this country has as 
responsible for the OHQ, a most probable consequence for Sweden will be 
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deepened cooperation, not only with Norway, Finland and United 
Kingdom, but also with other EU and NATO countries as well. 
 
Because of the establishment of a Nordic EU BG, cooperation has also 
reached a more practical and detailed levels. For example, command and 
control at the national political–military strategic level has to be 
coordinated with the overarching Union one, operational planning and 
execution needs to be coordinated between Estonia, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden as well as with the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and procedures 
regarding these levels has to be developed parallel with the development of 
the EU BG itself. These ongoing processes will enhance cooperation 
between countries as well as having consequences inside the EU both 
politically and militarily with estimated big integrative effects.  
 
 
The European security strategy – an engine that supports change 
 
One reason to publish the European security strategy in December 2003 
was a need for defining and making the security policy aims of the union 
clear, which might be understandable bearing in mind how fast EU itself 
and ESDP has developed. One other reason is the need for a roadmap 
ahead, which gives the signal that EU wishes to be an independent security 
political actor, not only verbally. There is an obvious need among the EU 
member-states to enhance a common security policy understanding, as well 
as a common culture for Crises Management100. It might be a sign of the 
effect the doctrine has had in the different capitals of the union, that the 
present common view among policy-makers, seems to be that something 
substantial has to be done, not at least when it comes to the question of 
strengthening the military capacities of the union.  
 
The doctrine very clearly states that EU needs to be a more actively 
international player, more unified and more able to take action. The High 
Representative Javier Solana underlines the importance of developing a 
strategic culture that fosters early, quick and if necessary robust 
interventions. Solana also underlines the importance of operations that 
combines military and civilian capacities, as a consequence of a broad 
capability list at disposal for EU101.  
 
Also the doctrine communicates the necessity of developing capabilities in 
cooperation between the member-states more systematically as well as a 
need for more flexible and mobile forces able to handle the new threats. 
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The doctrine gives a clear signal that EU capabilities and those from 
member-states needs better coordination102. This message has to be viewed 
in a broader security context. One result of European integration is that the 
borders of the union are getting closer to ”security hotspots”, where almost 
automatically a secure environment on the other side of the Mediterranean, 
in the North Africa, is of paramount importance, as is the termination of 
ongoing conflicts in the Balkans. This, automatically identifies two 
mission-areas, one as probably upcoming respectively one to be continued. 
To be added as potential mission-areas are also South Caucasus and Middle 
East103.  
 
It is interesting to note that Norway has developed a strategic concept, 
“Strength and relevance” (Styrke og relevans), in which, because of 
Norway’s status as a non-member of EU, the possibility for allied, non-
union, members to participate in EU led operations is viewed to be of 
significant importance. It is the opinion of the government in Oslo that 
participation with substantial capabilities is the way to gain influence even 
for a non EU-member. At the same time the Norwegian strategic concept 
emphasises the limitations Norway, as a non-union member, will have on 
the overall political guidance regarding EU operations104. There are worries 
inside the Norwegian establishment that being sidelined in European Union 
defence issues, could end up with a marginalization also within NATO. 
The Norwegian tendency, as a NATO but non-EU member, to consider 
participation in the ESDP process as a link for closer integration with EU in 
broader terms, was clearly demonstrated on 21 September 2004 when the 
country expressed its interest in contributing to the EU rapid reaction 
force105. 
 
Arguments for EU to become a more active actor reflects indirectly a need 
for better coordination of already existing resources as well as better 
cooperation when new capabilities are acquired. Increased defence budgets 
may be an aim but is a highly doubtful wish as long as there is no 
perception of a major security threat to the member-states of the union. 
Synergy effects as a result of good cooperation is probably a faster way of 
getting results, where the tri-lateral cooperation between Finland, Norway 
and Sweden to establish an EU Battlegroup, very much reflects possibilities 
that lays in long-time fruitful cooperation concerning Crises management. 
 
                                                 
102 Tofte, DNAK 3-2004.  
103 Tofte, DNAK 3-2004.   
104 Styrke og relevans: strategisk konsept for forsvaret. Forsvarsdepartementet, Oslo 
2004, p. 36.  
105 Irina Isakova, “ESDP after the EU Constitution”, RUSI Journal, February 2005, p. 
33. 
 57
From the Swedish perspective, development of the EU Battlegroup is a 
most significant show of willingness to reach higher ambitions with the 
ability to participate in international crises management operations. In 
addition, this bigger ability is developed in order to meet requirements both 
from EU and UN106. The Swedish transformation, is from an overall point 
of view, in line with the European security strategy, which emphasise the 
need to transform the armed forces inside the union towards more 
flexibility and give them tools with which they can meet identified new 
threats107.  
 
To sum up the transformation process that is taking place in Sweden, 
following table compares main characteristics between a defence system 
against invasion versus an active security policy tool. When this is said 
main part of the table describes the situation in many European countries 
including the Nordic countries Denmark and Norway as well. 
 
 
Defence against invasion  Actively used security  policy tool 
Preventive approach Oriented towards involvement 
Defence against massive military 
invasion 
Continuously ongoing crises 
management operations 
National perspective Multinational perspective 
Stored material/ mobilisation 
system 
Frequently used military capabilities
Opponent well defined Blurred picture of opponent (-s) 
Quantity based organisation Quality based organisation 
Focus: Plans, admin., conscript trg. Focus: Ongoing crises management 
operations 
Fixed structures Modular structures 
Operational environment defined Variation of operational 
environment 
 
When listed factors are compared, two entirely different military systems 
occur. One immediate conclusion that can be drawn by studying factors 
presented is that the Swedish transformation process will take a certain 
amount of time. One reason is that the whole mindset created in the old 
system has to be changed dramatically. Another, perhaps more predictable 
reason is that the implementation of new doctrine, training and material 
also will need a certain amount of time to be implemented.  
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Concept development – facts and reflections 
 
The Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on defence stresses 
the general importance of Swedish units having high and same quality as 
units from countries with which Sweden cooperates. The importance of 
flexibility and mobility in rapid reaction forces means that they are 
expected to be able to shift between levels of conflict, tasks and 
geographical environment as well as being interoperable with a broad 
spectrum of partner-countries and civilian actors. Part of this quality-
reform is a continued development of a network-based defence108.  
 
The transformation of the Swedish defence forces shows an ambition that 
operational requirements are in focus, also in the near future. Priority is 
given to international commitments and the ability of rapid reaction, which 
will increase from both a qualitative and quantitative aspect 109. Seen from 
the perspective that the Nordic EU BG is expected to be operational from 
January 2008, this ambition fits in rather well. The Report of the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence is also emphasising the 
need for high personal as well as material quality110.  
 
The ability to reach high quality related to the material aspects is estimated 
to be met. It might be more difficult to meet the demands regarding the 
personal quality and more specifically the quality-profile of officers. 
Reason is that the ongoing process with reductions in the numbers of 
officers will, due to labour-market regulations, force the defence authorities 
to resign a substantial number of younger officers, in age-groups fit to fill 
positions in the Nordic EU BG. Out from a total of about 1500 personnel 
all ranks, the contribution from Sweden will number some 1100, from 
Finland 200, from Norway 150 and from Estonia to be decided during 
spring 2005. Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) are 
included in these figures. Five to ten days after decision taken, units of the 
Battlegroup shall be operational in a minor Crises management operation 
(up to 120 days) or have the role as advanced party in a more complex one. 
 
On the operational level one or several BG (-s) are commanded by Force 
Headquarters (FHQ), which together constitutes the ready-reaction-
capability. One EU OHQ (combined and joint) shall, if needed, be able to 
command the military part of an EU led Crises management operation 
where this specific HQ gets political Guidance from EU. A FHQ is an 
instrument for Command and Control on the operational level and is the 
highest military level of the Union in a Crises Management Operation. 
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FHQ for the Nordic BG will have the capacity to lead one or more BG(-s) 
as well as supporting elements and will consists of HQ-units and a staff of 
approximate 70 staff officers from participating nations, where the main 
body are Swedes111. The command and control link on the military strategic 
level for the Nordic BG is the OHQ in Northwood in United Kingdom, one 
of four certified OHQs to be at the disposal for the Union, which seems to 
be a natural choice when there is no such headquarters available neither in 
Sweden nor in Finland and the Norwegian OHQ in Stavanger is not an 
alternative as long as Norway is not a member of EU. Also from the 
intelligence perspective Northwood may be a valuable choose because it 
represents one of the terminating points of both EU as well as NATOS 
intelligence databases112.  
 
Missions for the Nordic BG are covered by the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council (GAERC) 17 May 2004 and includes following 
- Joint disarmament operations 
- Humanitarian and rescue tasks 
- Peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crises management, 
including peacemaking 
- Support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector 
reform.113 
 
Fighting terrorism is a task of specific interest. Different views between the 
Nordic capitals as well as inside the union regarding the use of military 
force against terrorist groups has to be sorted out in order to create the 
same set of rules inside the union as well as for forces from the union 
operating outside its borders.  
 
Identified tasks, probable future missions and mission areas, makes it 
highly probable that the Nordic BG will face actors operating out from 
asymmetrical concepts. The aim of these actors will be to do the 
unexpected. Non-traditional concepts of attacking, which are totally 
different from the rules, tools or methods used by the part being attacked, 
can be expected. Innovative use of tactics and technology in combination 
with the ambition to hit as many critical vulnerabilities as possible, with the 
aim to break the will of the opponent, can also be expected. These methods 
are tactical in essence but combined with for instance psychological tools, 
which aim is to manipulate the citizens in the opposing nation, results will 
be reached on the strategic level, because the will of the entire nation to 
continue an ongoing operation can be hampered. There is a general 
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tendency that asymmetrical threats that might influence an EU operation 
are reasonable well defined when it comes to actors as well as their tools 
and methods. One observation is that conclusions drawn and the input these 
have on consequences for how the military is composed and trained can be 
improved substantially.    
 
Core unit and manoeuvre element in the Nordic BG is a mechanized 
battalion with two mechanized companies, one air-mobile squadron, one 
logistics company and a HQ-/ Mortar company. This manoeuvre element 
is, despite of five Finnish staff officers, entirely Swedish. Composition of 
supporting elements may include mortar-, engineer-, air defence-, 
information, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), 
helicopter-, nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) capabilities as well as 
units used for protection of important/ sensitive infrastructure and forward 
air controllers (FAC). In addition, operational and strategic enablers are 
pre-identified. These are consisting of air- and naval forces together with 
logistics- and other special functions as strategic as well as tactical air 
transport, close air support (CAS), air port of departure units, strategic 
sealift, and traffic control units114. 
 
A first draft of preliminary costs until 2008 is shown in table below. It 
should be underlined that there are many question marks that indicate 
higher costs than estimated here115. 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
101 million116 302 million 842 million 1.050 billion 
   
 
In Sweden there has been an ongoing discussion, questioning registered 
units in HFC, mainly those from the navy and air force. Doubts have 
concentrated on why having units from the navy and air force in HPC. It 
has been argued that these units are expensive and not asked for in 
missions. Its worth observing that so far, the EU operations has been very 
limited in numbers, with the consequence that it might be too early to 
conclude which resources are needed and which are not. In addition it 
might not at least be of political interest that Sweden shows the ambition to 
participate with capabilities from each end every service117. From the 
authors perspective in-fight between the three services in a situation with 
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scarce economical resources, as a result of ongoing discussions before the 
Defence decision in December 2004, might be a reason, which is 
interesting from the present perspective, where the EU BG concept, 
including the Nordic one, foresee reinforcements from all branches of the 
armed forces.  
 
Taken into account identified tasks, environmental factors in most probable 
mission areas and opposing actors who may favour asymmetrical concepts, 
there might be a risk with the force composition mentioned. The risk is that 
the main body of the Nordic EU BG concept is too heavy for quick 
response with enough force at disposal. EU military capacity shortages are 
well-identified and common knowledge. Lack of qualified Command and 
Control, ISTAR, strategic air- and sealift capacities as well as some types 
of qualified weapons are identified as specifically critical. When the Nordic 
BG is operational early 2008, it can be estimated that critical resources that 
will help the concept to get maximum affect might not be available. The 
political will to succeed is there even if it could be wise to put a question 
mark when it comes to money. Time to solve these limitations is however 
very short. The consequence might be that we will have a Nordic EU BG 
not able to exploit its full operational effect, neither with resources from the 
three Nordic countries, nor from the wider union perspective.  
 
Consequently, if the concept of the Nordic BG is to be fully implemented, 
strategic transport capabilities, both in the air and at sea, are most critical, 
which is a problem for all EU member except United Kingdom. Existing 
railway nets and road systems used in combination makes it possible to 
reach probable conflict areas on the European continent. In the western 
parts the fully use of this combination is possible and here it is essential to 
stress the importance of heavy road transport units as a most critical 
resource. Operations in the eastern parts of Europe however, will be 
heavily dependent on the railroads118. The possibility to reach land-locked 
areas will dependent on an airlift capacity if rapid deployment of units and 
logistical sustainment is going to be realised. If airport and port facilities 
are available in an area of tension or conflict, the combination of air- and 
sea-lift makes a quick reaction possible while at the same time heavier 
units and the main bulk of supply can use Sea Lines of Communication, 
which generally is the most economical alternative.  
 
The Swedish Armed Forces HQ is working with alternatives that have an 
ambition to solve the most critical shortfalls. A basic fact is that no 
economical resources are earmarked for the acquisition of strategic air- or 
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sealift capabilities between 2005-2016119. Adequate strategic air and sealift 
capabilities is a Swedish responsibility as framework nation. An airlift 
capability can be achieved within EU if nations are “pooling” resources, 
which means that they have to allocate own resources to the pool in order 
to be able to use it. The problem is mainly associated with strategic airlift 
resources, where it is estimated that from the national perspective, Sweden 
could have three C 17 aircraft operational 2020120, twelve years after the 
Nordic BG is expected to be operational! If pooled, it is also estimated that 
this arrangement should give Sweden the possibility to use four additional 
A 400 M121. One, maybe blurred, option might be the ability to use some A 
400 M that will enter service in a number of European countries from 2010 
and onwards122. The Strategic Air Lift Interim Solution (SALIS) will be 
operational until 2011-2012 after which A 400 will enter service in a 
number of European countries and the function of SALIS will be taken 
over by Strategic Air Lift Coordination Centre123. If these thoughts are 
realized, an acceptable level of strategic airlift capacity might be at hand. 
Sealift, concerning transportation of the Nordic BG, is expected to be 
provided by Swedish-Norwegian cooperation by using contracted ships and 
for logistic purposes by membership in the Sealift Co-ordination Centre 
(SCC) located in Eindhoven124. Strategic airlift is however the most critical 
tool because of EU requirements that Rapid Reaction Forces shall be 
operational in a conflict zone days after decisions has been made and 
bearing in mind that a number of most probable conflict areas are land 
locked.   
 
In Sweden proposals has been heard favouring the acquisition of an 
amphibious transport ship with a multi-role capacity. Main task would be 
transportation of units and supply. Additional roles could be as a command 
and Control facility, as a hospital-ship as well as a base for rescue 
operations. Using existing know-how, such a ship could be operational in 
three to five years after decision has been taken, with a cost of approximate 
200 million euros125. Bearing in mind that the Nordic EU Battlegroup is 
expected to be operational the first of January 2008, such an acquisition, if 
priorities are changed and decision is taken in the next White Paper on 
defence in 2008, this essential capability gap cold be filled in 2011-2013. 
Such a ship would ensure sustainability for a BG on operations while at the 
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same time Sweden could offer a most wanted resource to other nations, 
which increases the role of Sweden as EU member and cooperation-
partner126. 
   
High logistical demands have to be met. A most probable conflict-picture 
characterised by simultaneously ongoing, high-intensive/ low-intensive 
operations on both the operational and tactical levels, means that very 
different demands has to be met at the same time. High-intensive 
operations will need a robust military logistic organisation, which easily 
can adapt to Combat-Arms units that frequently are task-organized. At the 
same time low-intensity operations might be sustained by using civilian 
contractors, coordinated by a military logistic staff element. Dependent on 
the intensity in different areas of an actual conflict, this staff element can 
have detached military logistic components, being ready to give them away 
to a new “hotspot”, and ready to be replaced by civilian contractors.  
 
The need to strengthen the quality of training has been observed by the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) where joint exercises in bigger formations are 
defined to be of urgent need127. Also it is the opinion of the government 
that exercises have to reflect more the specific demands Swedish units will 
face in international operations and that these types of exercises have to get 
priority128. Also, in order to enhance European crises management 
capabilities and European interoperability there is a need to create a system 
where quality and operational ability are tested from a set of common 
criteria’s, out of which their usefulness for international crises management 
operations can be evaluated129.  
 
Closely connected with ambitions regarding training standards and 
readiness, parts of the BG must be able to enter war-fighting without 
mobilisation or complementary training. From a Swedish perspective, that 
view represents a big change, because in practice this personnel has to be 
on contract. In addition the mental impact on the organisation, as a whole 
might be quite substantial. In practice this means that a new armed forces 
culture, with a code and ethos focusing on the militaries role as the 
Swedish number one repressive instrument, will develop more 
professionalism because the organization as a whole will have mission 
experience. The tendency from the 1970’s up to the 1990’s where military 
personnel were looked upon as just another group of public servants, have 
no future in an organization which is used as an active security policy tool. 
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Also important for establishing a Nordic EU BG is that the structure of the 
Swedish officers corps will have to undergo big changes. Ambitions is to 
reduce the number of officers serving in staff- and administrative positions 
and increase the numbers able to serve in the units. The consequence will 
be that the main body of the officer corps are expected to serve until 35–40 
years of age and a group of those will serve in NCO related assignments, if 
not a NCO group, or a group equivalent with those, could be established.  
 
In order to meet new and more demanding quality-demands, a new 
conscript system has been launched. Main aim of such a system is to recruit 
for longer-term service in international missions. The individual decision to 
participate in international crises management operations is taken after 
basic training, which is lengthened to eleven months. After that the 
individual is allowed, to sign the contract mentioned, dependent on his or 
her willingness to serve in international missions. That contract includes an 
additional period of six months training and validation. After seventeen 
months the individual has one and half more year to serve on the contract, 
in missions as well as on additional training. When the contract period is 
over the individual gets a bonus and goes for employment in the civilian 
society130. 
 
As a consequence, soldiers serving in the most qualified units will be on 
contract. Ongoing tendency is that conscription will be more or less 
voluntary for those prepared to sign up for one or more missions abroad. 
But for the foreseeable future there is no sign that professionals will replace 
conscription. Reason is that conscription allows for testing a good portion 
of the population, which helps in the search for quality. More probably 
soldiers on contract will be a complementary recourse to conscription. 
There is however a more serious aspect related to the question of manning, 
with implications even on modest ambitions like the establishment of a 
Nordic EU BG. For a period of two years from 2005, no new Swedish 
officers will be recruited131. The result will be an increased unbalanced age-
structure in the officer corps with negative consequences for manning units 
for international missions with adequate quality. 
 
 
Implications for the future transformation – some reflections 
 
One motivated question might be if and how the development and future 
use of a single Nordic BG will effect further transformation of the armed 
forces. First, one has to bear in mind that the future of the Swedish armed 
forces reflects a small organization, where ongoing work to establish the 
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Nordic EU BG will have consequences for almost the entire organization.  
Second, and as a result of a relatively limited volume as well as the fact 
that units are frequently used in missions creates, an environment where 
transformation is an ongoing process driven by mission-related experience, 
where it might not be too unrealistic to predict substantial changes in the 
now adopted concept. Third, the formalized studies and development 
system, developed from the late 1960’s, is expected to loose most of its 
previous influence in favor of a much more dynamic process, where 
recently gained experience and lessons learned is implemented rapidly.    
 
In the second chapter of this book Mika Kerttunen argues about shortfalls 
associated with the BG concept that, already in the conceptual phase, could 
be foreseen. In sum they are associated mainly with more demanding and 
sustained missions reflecting EU's generally lack of suitable military 
capabilities. More powerful resources in numbers and quality is what might 
be needed in order to serve the goal presented in “A secure Europe in a 
better world”.  
 
There seems to exist views that EU BG’s will be able to execute 
autonomous operations. These views have to be connected with some of 
the main characteristics of future autonomous operations initiated and 
executed by EU:  
- A quick initial response to the actual crises that will generally serve the 
purpose of demonstrating political will as well as military ability and at 
the same time, from a military point of view, secure the arrival of follow 
on forces. 
- Next, creation of a secure environment might involve military 
operations on low intensity up to high intensity – simultaneously. 
- Lastly, sustaining a secure environment, which is a prerequisite for post-
conflict peace-building. This process has generally a long duration and 
requires a lot of work in order to create confidence among the 
population, and confidence-building is personal intensive.  
    
Autonomous operations, anyway when we talk about those who might 
involve a substantial amount of violence, will demand higher echelons, 
where the EU BG concept probably not will be sufficient. In this aspect, 
comparisons with countries outside as well as inside EU, can be made. In 
order to meet operational demands that are closely connected with rapid 
reaction ability, high tactical, operational as well strategic mobility has to 
be met. Rapid reaction units on brigade- and division level are designed for 
a quick reaction to an upcoming crises which in practice is the same as 
being operational in the respective “hotspot” in days, have the capacity to 
calm down the situation by own resources, or if that is not possible, serve 
as an advanced party, securing incoming reinforcements. 82nd Airborne 
Division from USA, UK Air assault Brigade and 11th Mobile Brigade from 
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the Netherlands meets criteria’s mentioned above. If these types of units 
face heavy resistance they will take the role as an advanced party for 
incoming heavier forces.  
 
The concept behind the creation of a European Rapid Deployment Force, 
presented in Helsinki Headline Goal in December 1999, might still serve as 
the military framework for the fulfilling of ambitions presented in “A 
secure Europe in a better world”. The role of Nordic cooperation in such a 
bigger picture has of course to be viewed together with the other EU 
nations, but one assumption that could be made easily is that if the 
Netherlands are able to field a mobile brigade, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
and Denmark might together be able to establish a brigade sized unit as 
well.  
 
Development of Nordic crises management concepts and tools takes place 
inside the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support 
(NORDCAPS). The Nordic Brigade, earlier established in the framework 
of this organization, might be a useful tool concerning the development of 
more substantial crises management tools. Characteristics made earlier in 
this section of a future crises management operation indicates the necessity 
to have following capacities: One type suited for quick response, which 
demonstrates political will and military ability and at the same time 
securing the arrival of follow on forces. Another type, which creates a safe 
environment by being involved in operations covering the spectrum from 
low intensity to high intensity – simultaneously. A third type, sustaining a 
secure environment, which is a prerequisite for peace building, a process 
that generally is extended over a long time. In other words what might be 
needed are forces fast, strong and sustainable enough for establishing 
military presence, create a safe enough environment and secure as well as 
support the nation-building process.  
 
NORDCAPS covers levels from the political132, the military strategic133 to 
the tactical ones, with an aim to expand and strengthening Nordic 
cooperation in the field of military peace support.134 The concept itself 
could easily be developed towards a broader spectrum of missions covering 
military and civilian interagency crises management operations. The logical 
military output from defined tasks discussed earlier in this chapter is a 
brigade with following main components: 
  
                                                 
132 The political level is represented by a Steering group. 
133 The Military Coordination group is established in order to coordinate the military 
level after directives given by NORDCAPS Steering Group. 
134 Nordic Brigade, http://tietokannat.mil.fi/np03/part_nordbde.php?printable=1& , 4 
March 2005. 
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• An airmobile battalion with high tactical, operational as well as 
strategic mobility as the main tool for rapid response. Trained to 
fulfil combat tasks, but has less protection and firepower than the 
mechanized battalion as well as suggested infantry battalion. 
Relatively modest to support logistically. C-130 system in service in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden could be used for airlift. With a light 
equipment alternative, including tree days of supply (DOS), one 
squadron can be lifted by tree C-130’s. Sweden is organizing such a 
unit with one Squadron assigned to the Nordic EU BG. The unit will 
be comprised of contracted soldiers and will be operational from 
2007. To get the same status to the rest of the battalion will need the 
recruitment of additional soldiers on contract with an estimated 
timeframe of two years after next defence decision in 2008. 
  
• One mechanized battalion with a tank Squadron as the main follow-
up-force and provider of fighting power needed in order to create a 
safe environment. A broad variety of combat tasks could be solved 
with limitations mainly connected with operational and strategic 
mobility. Sealift/railway/land transportation is at present main 
possibilities135. The C 130- system cannot be used and a heavy air 
transport capability, anyway for part of such a battalion, will be 
needed in the future. Provider of this Mechanized battalion could be 
Denmark, where the Danish International Brigade includes such a 
unit. The Danish International Brigade, which in addition has two 
mechanized infantry battalions, an artillery battalion together with 
other CS and CSS elements forms a suitable structure from which 
augmented capacities for the mechanized battalion can be drawn. 
The brigade is reported to be a part of the Allied Rapid Reaction 
Corps (ARRC) and consists of approximate 4500 all ranks, where 
20% are regulars and 80% conscripts with a contract that makes it 
possible to call them up for service during a period of tree years.136   
 
• One infantry battalion needed both for more demanding operations in 
order to secure a safe environment as well as providing “boots on the 
ground” which will be an essential part for securing the peace-
building process. The Norwegian Telemark battalion might fit into 
this role, however the pure infantry component is limited and may 
need reinforcements especially when entering a peace-building 
phase. The combat capability of Telemark battalion lies somewhere 
in between a mechanized and an airmobile battalion. Numbering 450 
                                                 
135 To give an impression of the logistical demands: When Sweden provided a 
reinforced CV 90 company to the United Nations Liberia-mission, it required 200 
containers to get the company to the mission area. 
136 Nordisk Sikkerhet, p. 63 
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professionals and 80 on contract the battalion is built around one 
mechanized infantry company with CV 90/ M 113, one tank 
squadron with Leopard 2A3 and one combat engineer company as 
well an Headquarters-/logistics company. Augmented are antitank, 
medical, mortar, forward air control/fire control units and a national 
support element137. 
 
• One military police battalion which will have a limited role in high 
intensive operations but on the other hand is a most useful tool 
against non conventional opponents as well as in the peace-building 
phase. This face will need a substantial number of Military police 
units that can do normal police functions, train the local police as 
well as take part in counter-insurgency operations. Organizing such a 
battalion could eventually be made on a trilateral base between 
Finland, Norway and Denmark.  
 
• CS and CSS units as well as strategic enablers discussed earlier in 
this chapter.  
 
Being capable of dealing with an opponent using asymmetric concepts 
generates a need to adopt intelligence-driven operations. In such an 
environment the need for technical intelligence-components are reduced in 
favour of human intelligence (HUMINT) combined with deep cultural 
knowledge. This has to be reflected in an intelligence structure at all levels 
that is capable of using both military and non-military sources and is able 
of smooth coordination with local and regional authorities, agencies as well 
as commercial organizations of the country where mission takes place.   
 
Manning this structure will be most demanding, especially when ongoing 
operations for longer periods seems to be norm for the future. For such 
operations it has to be considered that in order to field one battalion there is 
a need being able to man tree battalions for each one on operations. Besides 
the one on operations, one is on training ready to go into an operation, and 
one is on leave. 
  
From the Swedish point of view this demand may be hard to solve bearing 
in mind that total number of conscriptions each year will number some 
8300 in total 138. Planned structure with a Nordic BG needs 900 soldiers on 
contract and trained by first of January 2008. At least three conclusions can 
be drawn out from these figures. First, in reality this means that the basic 
task of training conscripts is to recruit soldiers ready to serve in 
international missions. Second, it could be argued that the system Sweden 
                                                 
137 Nordisk Sikkerhet, p. 18. 
138 Svenska Dagbladet, 2 March 2005. 
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is establishing with soldiers on contract are just another name on 
professional soldiers, because it seems logic to characterize a soldier with 
eleven months basic training and an additional training-period of half a 
year as professional. Third and most important, there is an obvious need to 
limit the number of ongoing operations in which Sweden is involved in 
order to be able to participate in more demanding operations, which might 
have spill-over-effects into the union. Having the ability to do this has the 
obvious consequence of focusing on missions where more substantial 
commitments are needed and where a positive outcome is critical for EU 
and Sweden.   
 
One important area, when future structures are discussed, is the 
development of network-based capabilities. Of paramount importance is 
interoperability with forces from EU and NATO countries where Swedish 
forces – anyway from a more practical aspect – is more interoperable than 
most new and in some cases old NATO countries. The creation of network-
based capabilities could be looked upon as most critical in order to enhance 
efficiency. This subject could be viewed as a most practical subject. 
Following example is given to highlight the question. A battalion 
commander on the ground must have the ability to call for fire support, 
either from artillery, close air support or naval gunfire. What tool or which 
tools he or she decides to use depend on the tactical situation. But the 
communications has to be knitted together between the army, naval and air 
force units and the intelligence picture has to be the same.  
 
Other aspects with implications for the NBF concept are more and more 
internationalized conflicts, which has resulted in expeditionary thinking 
and structuring. The challenge will be to create operational flexibility and 
organisational stability. These are factors that simply cannot be united in an 
environment characterised by multi-dimensionality and task-organized 
forces. Key to success is well-trained personnel able to tackle a vide 
spectrum of missions with a broad variety of military capacities. Perhaps 
flatter structures can help to solve the problem, taken into consideration 
that anyway land forces structure with a pyramid organisation from section 
to Army Corps represents an organisational culture dating back to 
Napoleon I. Task organisation in reality is a first step to develop modular 
network-structures that are replacing pyramid ones created during the 
industrial era. 
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Final remarks 
 
In sum the previous discussion argues that the EU BG concept is an 
instrument not for “small wars”, but for short wars, because the main focus 
for the military power-instrument of our time are missions in conflicts that 
can best be characterized as ”small wars” of long duration with varied and 
limited use of force. A consequence of that is a need to re-evaluate 
traditional criteria for success, because success in ”small-wars” are less 
dependent on for instance mobility and fire-power. Because “small wars” 
tend to be long wars, confidence building towards the civilian population 
and the additional force protection that might be embedded as a result, are 
more important. Destabilizing actors like warlords, terrorist organisations 
and guerrilla could, as a result of successful confidence building, be denied 
from political support among the population with severe implications on 
recruitment and intelligence. Use of force in those “small wars” generally 
creates sensitive political situations. As a result, violence cannot be used 
without a keen analyze of probable consequences.  
 
Consequently, some of the criteria for success in ”small wars” are different 
from those used in intra-state wars. In “small wars”, the use of force should 
be avoided as long as possible and when this is unavoidable, the 
counterpart should ideally be aware of what behaviour will end up with 
repressive actions. This is a way of signalling to people in the mission area 
and influencing domestic opinion as well as the international community.  
 
To give three examples: In a situation where two regular forces are 
combating each other, surprise is a central factor in order to achieve 
success. In crises management operations the importance of surprise might 
be subordinated to other factors like legitimacy and predictability. These 
factors communicate political signals that will strengthen the peace –
building process and therefore have an increasing importance. Likewise, 
the importance of tempo is reduced. Of course tempo is needed in critical 
situations, when for instance use of force is necessary to prevent a 
massacre. But more farsighted factors, patience and confidence are the 
platforms from which peace can be built. Unity of command is another 
success-factor that ought to be viewed together with the factor 
coordination, which reflects the normal behaviour between coalition 
partners and covers the whole chain of command. In a coalition, continuous 
inputs in the chain of command from the different capitals are a reality with 
implications in civil-military relations at every level. For instance, the use 
of available forces is politically guided and today often limited. This 
guidance can be foreseen to continue even tomorrow.   
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Finally, it is estimated to be of utmost importance to take advantage of the 
unique competence of the EU in order to meet crises with a broad variety 
of tools. Interagency operations are a way of having the ability at lowest 
possible level to choose the adequate tool(-s). This means that military 
staffs on all levels has to be prepared to include liaisons from civilian 
agencies, commercial organisations, intergovernmental organizations as 
well as non-governmental organizations to ensure effective coordination. 
But it also means that the force needs special civil affairs units and be 
suited, when needed, to operate not only as a joint force but as an 
interagency force prepared for civil-military cooperation down to lowest 
possibly level in hostile environments representing different cultures.  
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FINLAND – National Defence and International Crisis 
Management 
Mika Kerttunen 
 
 
Decisions to participate 
 
The President of the Republic of Finland139 and the Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy (UTVA)140 decided on April 14, 2004 that 
Finland would examine her resources that could be available for the EU 
Battlegroup arrangement. As it had been clear from the very beginning, 
Finland did not have resources to be a framework nation141, and could not 
set up a national battle group without partners. Sweden was the first option 
to look to for obvious reasons. A larger NATO country would have been a 
suitable partner for Finland too, but the United Kingdom wanted to 
establish a national battle group with The Netherlands. She also endorsed 
the idea of incorporating Norway into a Nordic battle group. Germany, in 
the beginning, was reluctant to include Finland, but changed her mind later. 
Sweden for her part had two main options to consider: set up a national 
battle group or be a framework nation in a bi- or trilateral battle group. 
Quite soon it became obvious that at that moment, a national unit was out 
of bounds, and cooperation with Finland was examined142. Prime Ministers 
Göran Persson and Matti Vanhanen finalized the agreement on setting up a 
Nordic Battle Group at their talks in October and expressed hopes that 
                                                 
139 According to the Constitution of Finland the President of the Republic in cooperation 
with the Government directs the foreign policy of Finland. (The Constitution of Finland, 
11 June 1999 (731/1999), Chapter 8, Section 93).  
140 The Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy (known in Finland by it 
acronym UTVA (Ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittinen ministerivaliokunta)) is chaired by the 
Prime Minister and also includes the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of 
Defence, the other ministers designated to handle matters falling within the competence 
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and three other ministers designated by the Prime 
Minister. The committee handles the preliminary preparation of matters relating to 
foreign and security policy, Finland’s relations to other countries and important issues 
of national defence. In matters where the President is responsible for directing foreign 
policy, the President chairs proceedings. Though EU matters fall within the 
Government’s purview the matters relating to the EU CFSP are dealt with at such 
meetings with the President. (http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml/page_id/278 
/topmenu_id/4/menu_id/278/this_topmenu/111/lang/3/fs/12)  
141 The EU defines Framework Nation as a Member State or a group of Member States 
that has volunteered to, and that the Council has agreed to be a Framework Nation and 
that have specific responsibilities in an operation over which EU exercises political 
control. In practise a Framework Nation has the responsibility to administer the 
preparations, plan and lead joint exercises and contribute with all the troops and 
functions the participating nations cannot fill in.  
142 Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds, Vad vill Sverige med EU och FN? 14 April 2004 
(Seminar on EU’s role in the world and the relations between the EU and the UN).  
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Norway would join the force143. In 3 November UTVA decided that Finland 
would not only set up a Battlegroup with Sweden (and Norway and 
Estonia) but that Finland also would join the Battlegroup set up by 
Germany and The Netherlands. The contributions were announced in the 
Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, in Brussels, 22 November 
2004.  
 
The aforementioned governmental decisions stem from a larger security 
policy context and tradition, where crisis management has been a tool to 
advance Finnish interests. Participation in international crisis management 
is an essential part of the Finnish foreign and security policy. It aims to 
improve both international security and security of Finland. The European 
Union is one of the most important frameworks not only for the Finnish 
foreign policy but also for the defence policy. As stated in the Government 
report Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004 “Finland is working to 
strengthen the European Union as a security community and an 
international actor”. The effectiveness together with the coherence of the 
EU is vital for Finland. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
cannot exist without actual content and efficiency. It should not split the 
Union into two: those who participate in the structural cooperation and 
those who remain outside of it.144 The fact that all Member States are 
contributing to the Battlegroup concept has been welcomed with 
satisfaction in Finland145. Finland for her part, wants to participate fully in 
the development and implementation of the common security and defence 
policy.  
 
The Foreign Ministers Lena Hjelm-Wallén, Sweden, and Tarja Halonen, 
Finland, proposed for the EU Inter-Governmental Conference in 1996 that 
crisis management in general and the so-called Petersberg tasks in specific 
should be made a Union competence. The Union must “[b]e in a position to 
apply the whole gamut of instruments, from conflict prevention measures 
of various kinds to armed peacekeeping actions”.146 In the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1997 humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking, were 
listed as crisis management tasks for the EU. This initiative can also have 
other purposes than to increase competence in crisis management, a 
                                                 
143 Helsingin Sanomat, 4 October 2004. 
144 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004; Government Report to Parliament 24 
September 2004. Prime Minister’s Office Publications No 18/2004. Helsinki, 2004, pp. 
79-80.  
145 Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, 16 November 2004 (Seminar on security policy, 
arranged by Kaleva in Oulu (www.valtioneuvosto.fi/vn/liston/text.lsp?r=90046&k=fi 
(28 February 2005)). 
146 “Swedish-Finnish initiative to strengthen the EU’s conflict management capability”, 
Helsingin Sanomat (HS) and Dagens Nyheter (DN), 21 April 1996.  
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development it started and which has led to expanding tasks and structured 
defence related cooperation within the Union framework. It was however a 
proposition to hinder the merger of the EU with the WEU, an option that 
both countries resisted147. Both countries wanted to emphasise the primacy 
of NATO and the United States in European defence. This should not be 
jeopardized by lukewarm European enterprises. 
 
Another delaying battle between more deepened defence cooperation and 
the desire to remain militarily non-aligned was fought during the 
Intergovernmental Conference tackling the question on the EU 
Constitutional Treaty. With respect to provisions on security and defence 
policy the supplemented Petersberg tasks were not a problem to Finland, 
nor was the Article I-43, the solidarity clause requiring the provision of 
assistance in case of a terrorist attack. Article I-41 Specific provisions 
relating to the common security and defence policy was however more 
problematic. Before the December 2003 negotiations the Finnish 
Government had objected to the permanent structured cooperation allowing 
willing and able Member States to proceed in developing their capabilities 
for more demanding missions. This mindset was feared to rupture the 
coherence of the EU, a cornerstone in the Finnish EU policy – at least in 
the field of security and foreign policy. The real fight was fought to 
formulate Article I-41.7 concerning provision of assistance. Though 
Finland agreed with the obligation of aid and assistance in case of armed 
aggression on a Member State territory148, she wanted to maintain her 
military non-alignment – verbally at least – with a sentence referring to 
“[t]he specific character of the security and defence policy of certain 
Member States”. The critics of the current Finnish government say that 
Finland spent too much of her political firepower to hinder the 
development when it did not need to be hindered. It seems inevitable that 
the security and defence policy will deepen and enlarge in the near future – 
not only crisis management but mutual assistance, too. The realization of a 
common defence depends on the experiences gained in implementing the 
Constitutional Treaty, integration of the EU in general, and the 
development of the security situation and transatlantic relations149.  
 
                                                 
147 It would not have been “[c]onsistent with Finland’s and Sweden’s policy of non-
participation in military alliances”. The ministers also emphasised that a distinction 
must be maintained between territorial defence and cooperation in crisis management. 
(HS and DN, 21 April 1996) That the two nations and their defence forces now are 
facing the consequences of the initiative has been already raised in the first chapter of 
this book. On the affects of emphasising NATO e g Mika Kerttunen, “Jaakobin ääni ja 
Eesaun kädet – Naton moniulotteinen laajeneminen”, Tiede ja Ase, No 55, 1997, pp. 55-
78. 
148 Government Report 2004, p. 56. 
149 Government Report 2004, p. 56. 
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Participating in two Battlegroups is politically important for Finland for 
various reasons. Cooperation with Sweden has specific symbolic value as 
the countries have worked together on many issues within the EU. The 
Swedish-Finnish-Norwegian unit underline Nordic cooperation, which 
traditionally has been of value in itself. Experiences from Nordic 
cooperation in various peacekeeping and peace support operations have 
normally been good, so one could expect that such a trilateral battle group 
would succeed. Norway contributes to a EU crisis management 
arrangement demonstrating that this development does not compete with 
NATO but completes it. The participation in the German-Dutch battle 
group offers Finland a good opportunity to cooperate with two strong and 
experienced EU and NATO countries. These two compositions “naturally 
have clear political significance to Finland”.150 Significant is that both 
Battlegroups are set up by countries that emphasise the importance of the 
United States and NATO in European security – countries that are not 
willing to compromise the transatlantic link by entirely European solutions. 
This might be the very signal and significance of the Finnish 
contribution.151 
 
Finnish security policy could be described as dualistic or ambivalent. Both 
the United States and the European Union are important, both national 
territorial defence and participation in international crisis management are 
essential, both soft security issues – liberal strategy for peace – and hard 
security questions – realistic strategy for peace – are emphasised. This dual 
approach has been criticised by domestic and international politicians and 
scholars152. A clearer commitment to Western institutions has been desired. 
Crisis management, which has helped both Sweden and Finland to remain 
outside of difficult political commitments, is now beginning to force them 
to take a clear stand and participate in activities that were out of question in 
the past. The Finnish Chief of Defence Admiral Juhani Kaskeala has 
emphasised that the development of the EU rapid response capabilities, the 
Battlegroups in particular, is not changing the very tasks the EU has set for 
                                                 
150 Vanhanen, 16 November 2004. Military, linguistic, geographical and cultural 
reasons and traditions have their say in such assessments and decisions, too.   
151 On the importance of the Unites States for the European security, see e g Matti 
Vanhanen, 20 December 2004 (Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s speech in the debate 
on the Security and Defence Policy report in Finnish Parliament) 
(http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/vn/liston/base.lsp?r=90868&k=en&old=1300 ). 
152 Helsingin Sanomat, 6 March 2005. The main opposition party the conservative 
National Coalition Party (Kansallinen kokoomus) has been most active to renew the 
Finnish security policy. It is worth mentioning that some members of the ruling social 
democratic party (Sosialidemokraattinen puolue) share the views of deeper 
involvement. See also William Hopkinson, Sizing and Shaping European Armed 
Forces. Lessons and Considerations from the Nordic Countries, SIPRI Policy Paper No 
7, Sipri, Stockholm, 2004.  
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itself153. It is however changing what both Sweden and Finland have been 
doing, perhaps even replacing it.  
 
 
Developing military crisis management 
 
Four main factors direct the development of the Finnish international crisis 
management capabilities and capacities. The EU troop and performance 
requirements together with the NATO Partnership for Peace Planning and 
Review Process (PARP) are the two most powerful external inputs. The 
third is Nordic crisis management cooperation. National defence capability 
is the internal factor. International participation is widely understood to 
support the development of the overall interoperability and credibility of 
national defence154. Particularly battalion size and the more demanding 
operations give valuable experiences to Finnish personnel and a reliable 
platform to test suitability of e g various command and control, 
surveillance or logistic systems. Interoperability increases Finland’s 
capability to receive foreign assistance in times of crisis. National defence, 
interoperability and crisis management are the cornerstones of the Finnish 
defence, one enhancing another. The two official emphasis in developing 
the defence system, the strengthening of the preparedness to prevent and 
repel a strategic strike and raising the level of defence preparedness, are 
said to “also improve Finland’s ability to participate in international crisis 
management, the importance of which is continuing to grow”155. National 
defence naturally benefits from having experienced commanders, well-
trained rank and file and tightly knitted units, but the mantra is also needed 
to sell the entire concept of international crisis management for the people 
that value the freedom of its own country above all.  
 
Finland has participated in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program 
since1994. The purpose has been (from the very beginning) to enhance 
Finland’s ability to participate in crisis management, to be more specific in 
peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations.156 Technical 
interoperability programs began in 1995 when Finland joined the Planning 
                                                 
153 Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, Taisteluosastojen perustaminen ei tuo muutoksia EU:n 
kriisinhallintatehtäviin, 23 February 2005. 
(http://www.mil.fi/puolustusvoimainkomentaja/1035.dsp).  
154 Government Report 2004, p. 95.  
155 Ministry of Defence, Operational and financial plan for the Ministry of Defence’s 
segment of administration in 2004-2007 
(http://www.defmin.fi/chapter_images/1134_ttsenglish.pdf). 
156 Kaisa Heikkilä, Suomi ja NATO:n rauhankumppanuusohjelma, Pääesikunnan 
kansainvälisen osaston julkaisuja 2/2000, Helsinki 2000, pp. 17-20; Pertti Torstila, 
Finland and the Evolving European Security Order, 19 November 1996 
(http://www.usemb.se/BalticSec/TORSTILA.htm);  
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and Review Process. The first initial phase was comprised of 13 
Interoperability Objectives (IO). They focussed on rather general issues of 
command, control, communications and computing, logistics and transport, 
infrastructure, language requirements, and flight support. At this moment, 
55 Partnership Goals (PG) have been addressed to Finland. The scope of 
the PGs have widened as NATO has developed its Partnership Working 
Program and as crisis management is becoming more demanding. Civilian 
emergency planning is one of the new areas included in the program. 
Capabilities to respond to risks arising from the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and for defence against terrorism are similarly 
incorporated. In addition to fulfil the aforementioned goals of international 
crisis management the IO/PG has helped to fill the gaps needed for joint 
operations of Finnish key forces157 and Finland’s ability to receive foreign 
military aid. The third function of the PfP and PARP processes is that they 
have been used to respond to commitments to the EU Headline Goal as 
well158. This is most natural because the EU follows most of the NATO 
standards and procedures in crisis management. National force 
contributions for PfP activities should meet the general criteria of 
preparedness, readiness, deployment, multinationality, logistics and 
technical standards, which do not differ from other possible frameworks.   
 
At present Finnish international rapid deployment forces comprise a 
mechanized infantry battalion, a headquarters and signal company, an 
engineer battalion, several units specialized in civil-military cooperation, a 
medium truck company, a minelayer, and a number of staff officers and 
military observers159. Differing from the Swedish ambition of training all 
troops for international duties, designated units give training and a limited 
number of troops, which are trained for international tasks by Finland. The 
same applies to the PARP; only the most general objectives cover all troops 
or technical systems; interoperability is developed in the designated units. 
The main task of the Defence Forces and also the rapid deployment forces 
is to defend Finland and its people; participation in international crisis 
management is included in the tasks but is not the main focus. 
 
Nevertheless, Finnish capability to contribute is to be enhanced and 
increased. Within the Army, focus is on developing command and control 
systems – particularly to establish a brigade-level lead nation capability. 
Special forces and NBC defence troops together with intelligence, logistics, 
UAV reconnaissance and helicopter transport units are planned and to be 
trained for international tasks. The Navy will create a boarding team, a 
                                                 
157 Tomas Ries, Finland and NATO 
(http://www.mil.fi/perustietoa/julkaisut/finland_and_nato/foreword.dsp). 
158 Juha Harjula, speech at the meeting of the EAPC Defence Ministers, 8 June 2001 
(http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010608h.htm). 
159 Government Report 2004, p. 125. 
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coastal jaeger unit, a mine counter measures unit, and a special operations 
unit. The Air Force will train the surveillance of air space, e g no-fly zones 
as part of the protection (Combat Air Patrolling) for international military 
crisis management operation. From 2008 onwards the Air Force will have 
the capability to participate as part of a multinational flying unit. The latter 
requires a separate executive order.160  
 
 
Participation 
 
Finland, like many other nations, has earmarked same troops and units for 
several troop pools and registers: to the EU Helsinki Force Catalogue, to 
the NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council arrangement and to the UN 
Stand-By High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). At the same time Nordic 
countries have established a register and capabilities to assemble a 
multinational Nordic crisis management brigade within the Nordic 
Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS), again 
with the already triple hatted troops.161 One could therefore question the 
real effect and impact of these arrangements; they have not produced real 
capabilities. If no permanent command structures or order of battle exist 
and troops are drawn from the pools of forces on case-by-case basis, one 
cannot expect that all the troops have trained and exercised together. The 
level of interoperability is lower in the beginning, thus more time is needed 
before they can be deployed. Progress in crisis management capabilities has 
so far been made more on national level than internationally. The 
qualitative step the EU is now taking calls for faster deployment, requires 
additional material, and demands enhanced joint and combined training. 
New and better capabilities and capacities are needed.  
 
The potential and needed troops and elements identified for the 
Battlegroups include: 
- Mechanised infantry; a company (ca160 troops), including a team of 
combat engineers 
- NBC defence detachment (30) 
- Special operations forces (45) 
- Electronic warfare section (20) 
- Coastal jaegers: a platoon (35) 
- Command and control (e g Communication and Information Service, 
Signals and HQ Company personnel) (100). 
 
                                                 
160 Government Report 2004, pp. 125-126.  
161 Ministry of Defence, Operational and financial plan for the Ministry of Defence’s 
segment of administration in 2004-2007 
(http://www.defmin.fi/chapter_images/1134_ttsenglish.pdf). 
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The mechanized company and the NBC defence unit were the only already 
listed, and thus in full operational capability. The existing national troop 
production system based on conscription, rehearsal training and exercises, 
will develop and train the international rapid deployment forces. Of the 
identified troops and plans the services have for international capabilities a 
brigade-level C2 capability, mechanised infantry and engineer battalions, a 
transport company and a special operations unit will be fully operational in 
2006. A CIMIC company, a coastal jaeger platoon, a boarding team and an 
EW unit will reach full operational capability by 2008.162  
 
The Finnish troops and elements for the two Battlegroups163 are thought to 
be as follows (tentative lists):  
a) Nordic Battle Group 
Force Headquarters: 7-10 officers 
Infantry Battalion: Battalion Headquarters 5 officers 
Combat Support:  
- Fire Support Unit: a heavy mortar platoon (53 troops) 
- Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 
(ISTAR): a unit (55) 
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear defence: a 
detachment (25-30) 
Combat Service Support: 
- Logistic Support: a platoon/several groups (34) 
- Geographical Support: a group (6) 
- Military Police: a group (10) 
Total Finnish contribution: 180-220164. 
 
In addition to this Finland may contribute to the Operational and Strategic 
Enablers with personnel in Combat Service Support and Equipment 
Support functions and with Special Forces.  
 
Norway has the role of the Logistic Role Specialist Nation in medical 
service and in strategic air- and maritime lift, including airport and harbour 
deploying. She is going to contribute a medical platoon and a surgical unit. 
                                                 
162 Ministry of Defence, Puolustusministeriön hallinnonalan toiminta- ja 
taloussuunnitelma vuosille 2006-2009 (Operational and financial plan for the Ministry 
of Defence’s segment of administration in 2006-2009) 
(http://www.defmin.fi/chapter_images/2348_PLM_TTS_2006-
2009_julkisuuteen47.pdf). 
163 For the more detailed organisation, see the previous chapters on the EU Battlegroup 
context as well as on the Swedish contribution to the Battlegroups.  
164 ”Suomen osallistuminen Europan unionin taisteluosastoihin”, Ministry of Defence 
memorandum, 8 December 2004 
(http://www.defmin.fi/chapter_images/2307_Taisteluosastot.pdf ); Försvarsmakten, 
Budgettunderlag 06, Bilaga 1, Stockholm, 28 February 2005. 
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Other units or groups consist of movement control group and port and 
terminal operation squadron.165 Estonia is continuing consultations with 
Sweden; her troops and troops levels are not yet decided.  
 
It should be noted that the kernel of the Battlegroup, the mechanized 
infantry battalion ca 750 troops, 2 mechanized infantry companies, 1 light 
(air portable) infantry company, are entirely Swedish. This is reasonable 
from an operative perspective. The hard core of the Battlegroup master the 
same language166, has undergone similar training, know each other well and 
surely follow the same rules of engagement. It would take time for a 
multinational unit to reach that kind of interoperability, which is required in 
the most demanding tasks and situations. Combat support and combat 
service support units face this problem. How the Nordic Battlegroup 
actually is going to look and what the Finnish, Norwegian and Estonian 
contributions are, will be agreed as the countries evaluate their resources. 
What type of Battlegroup would be sent to an operation depends on the risk 
assessment and the task of the unit; variations and flexibility in 
organisation are possible, even desirable.  
 
b) German-Dutch-Finnish Battlegroup 
Force Headquarters: officers 
Mechanised Infantry Battalion:  
- Battalion headquarters: officers 
- Mechanised infantry company 
Combat Support: 
- Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition Reconnaissance 
(ISTAR): a group 
- Military Police: a group 
Combat Service Support: 
- Medical Service personnel 
- Maintenance Service personnel 
- Transport Service personnel 
Total Finnish contribution: 120-160167. 
 
As in the case of the Nordic Battle Group, Finland may contribute to the 
Operational and Strategic Enablers with personnel in Combat Service 
Support and Equipment Support functions and with Special Forces. In both 
                                                 
165 Försvarsmakten, Budgettunderlag 06, Bilaga 1, 28 February 2005, Stockholm. 
Norwegian contribution is at maximum 150 troops.  
166 This is an often-heard Swedish argument questioning the joint Swedish-Finnish unit 
in crisis management operations. It has been expressed in setting up battalions in 
Kosovo both in 1999 and again in 2005 as Sweden is rearranging her presence in the 
Balkans.  
167 ”Suomen osallistuminen Europan unionin taisteluosastoihin”, Ministry of Defence 
memorandum, 8 December 2004.  
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Battle Group scenarios Finland should get some staff officer posts at the 
Operative Headquarters, i.e. in the British Permanent Joint Headquarters at 
Northwood or at least establish a liaison team – preferably both. Finnish 
military-strategic views could then be taken into account in planning and 
executing the operations, and the Finnish Defence Forces Headquarters, 
Operation Headquarter, could be directly connected to the OHQ. Technical 
command, control, communication, computer and intelligence (C4I) 
solutions are essential but cannot overcome human presence.  
 
The roles of the Finnish mechanised infantry company are planned to be 
(BG HQ) force protection, reconnaissance and convoy protection. It will be 
equipped with SISU XA-180/200 series wheeled vehicles, a fact that 
guarantees an excellent mobility on highways and hard surfaces. This fits 
well with the task of convoy protection. Reconnaissance, on the other hand, 
could be limited due to the weaker mobility with respect to e g CV-90 
series tracked vehicles on softer, wet, surfaces of African monsoon season. 
The firepower is modest as the SISU XAs are equipped with 12.7 
millimetre machine guns, not 30 or 40 mm automatic cannons.   
 
The personnel for the Battlegroups will consist of regulars, i.e. officers and 
non-commissioned officers, enlisted personnel, and contract soldiers. 
Conscripts fulfilling their national service have and will not be used in 
international crisis management operations. Some 40 % of the personnel 
are assessed to be regulars, with the rest contract soldiers. Those eligible to 
be recruited should have already been trained for international duties 
during their national service. Exceptions are however possible. Regardless, 
all need to volunteer. The contract is thought to last for e g 1 + 1 year; the 
first year for training, exercises and the tour of duty, and the second for an 
optional service in some crisis management operation. If the person has 
participated in a Battlegroup operation during the tour of duty, then this 
optional international service would fall off. Contract soldiers would also 
be used as instructors if the Battlegroup duties allowed that.  
 
The rationality of participating in two Battlegroups from the point of force 
production is to enable a quite even flow of trainees every year. In every 
second 12-month period from July to June some 200 troops will be in 
service, both being trained and in preparedness or in operation, and in 
every 12-month period in-between a troop of ca 160 persons will do the 
same. The approximately same volumes make it easier to optimise the 
running of the education and training system.   
 
Initial and individual training will be given in Finland. After a certain level 
of personal competence is gained small scale functional exercises may take 
place. These are to be conducted in the country responsible for that 
function. Joint Battlegroup level exercises are the third phase. The focus is 
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then in seamless planning and execution of joint and combined tactical 
tasks. These take place either in the framework nation or, in later stages, in 
more demanding environments in another Member State or troop 
contributing nation. The latter is naturally more giving but requires more 
time, money and material. It would set press on – and train – also the 
logistic functions, including air and sealift. One can estimate that 8 to 12 
months training and exercise period is needed to meet the criteria set. The 
first two to three months could be used to individual to group level training. 
Several months should be reserved for Battlegroup level exercises – not 
that the troops are continuously in exercises but conduct a progressive and 
expanding exercise program. Concluding weeks before the stand-by period 
begin, are needed for rest, recreation and maintenance. During the stand-by 
periods training and exercises are continued to conduct, at a little lower 
level, naturally, keeping in mind the in-operation-in-10-days ambition.168 
Important to note is the Battlegroups in general and the Finnish 
contributions in particular consists of much more than just special 
operating forces – masked men abseiling from helicopters or training to 
free hostages, which we have seen on television. A truck driver and a cook 
are as much a part of the Battlegroup as a sniper or demolition expert. All 
have to be trained and equipped to meet the full range of crisis management 
tasks the Groups have.  
 
Certification is an important tool in securing the quality of the 
Battlegroups. It has been heavily discussed within the EU and the work 
continues. The definition of benchmarks and criteria for evaluation and 
certification is taken forward by the European Defence Agency. The 
general principle is that the Member States’ standards and criteria form the 
basis for this work and that the contributing Member States certify their 
troops. The overarching EU criteria concern availability, employability and 
deployability, readiness, flexibility, connectivity, sustainability, medical 
force protection and interoperability.169 The EU Military Committee is to 
monitor the certification process.  
 
Sweden in the case of the Nordic Battlegroup and the Swedish Force 
Commander and the Battalion Commander are for certain setting their own 
criteria with their troops, including the Finnish ones. The Swedish Armed 
Forces Headquarters has used the so-called basic functions to evaluate their 
own international troops. These areas are impact, mobility, protection, 
intelligence, sustainability and command and control. For tactical units 
perhaps a modification of the criteria originally set by the Swedish Total 
                                                 
168 General outlines for training and exercises period from Försvarsmakten, 
Budgettunderlag 06, Bilaga 1, Stockholm, 28 February 2005. 
169 Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2004 
(http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/82761.pdf). 
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Defence Research Institute (FOI) might be more suitable.170 General 
criteria for a Battlegroup certification could consist of: 
- Preparedness 
- Sustainability 
- Capacity for independent operations and action 
- Usability 
- Interoperability and jointness. 
 
With these or similar criteria one then can evaluate the qualitative level of 
the troops in areas like personal skills, command and control, combat tasks, 
and support functions. What must be the focus in Battlegroup certification 
is the ability for joint action. Individual to platoon level skills can be 
evaluated and obtained in the initial periods of training. 
 
 
Implications 
 
A number of political, juridical and military questions need to be answered 
before Finnish troops can participate in Battlegroup operations. These 
issues include: 
- National decision-making in relation to the EU planning and 
decision-making processes 
- National legislation, both the question of mandate and the legal 
status and rights of the individual participants 
- Rules of engagement  
- Funding 
- Recruiting and training personnel 
- Legally binding contracts 
- Terms of service 
- Equipment and critical material acquisition 
- Strategic enablers/assets.171 
 
The Finnish Government assesses that taking part in battle groups puts 
pressure on national decision-making procedures. The decision to 
participate in crisis management operations will be done by the President of 
                                                 
170 Urban Schöön, Insats eller föresats: Varför säkerhetspolitiska ambitioner inte alltid 
kan omsättas i militär effect eller förmåga, Försvarshögskolan C-uppsats, 19 100: 2038, 
Stockholm 2004, pp. 20-21 
(http://bibliotek.fhs.mil.se/publikationer/uppsatser/2004/chp0204/schoeoen_2038.pdf). 
National level criteria like costs and level of risk are left out here.  
171 Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, 20 December 2004 (Speech in the debate on the 
Security and Defence Policy report in Finnish Parliament); Commander Mikko 
Santavuori, A-talk, Finnish Broadcasting Company Channel 1, 8 December, 2004; 
Ministry of Defence memorandum, 8 December 2004; Puolustusministeriön 
hallinnonalan toiminta- ja taloussuunnitelma vuosille 2006-2009. 
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the Republic at the plenary session of the Government. Before the 
Government can make such a proposition it has to hear the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Parliament as defined in the Section 2 of the 
Peacekeeping Act172. Thus the final formal decision also on Battlegroup 
operations remains on national level and includes several national political 
authorities. Nevertheless, the de facto moment of decision is in the Council 
of the European Union, when the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council makes a unanimous decision to launch an operation. To ensure that 
the national decision-makers are properly involved and have time to be 
involved before any critical decision is discussed and made in the Council 
is a challenge. Given the Union’s ambition of launching an operation 
within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), 
the current Parliamentary hearings and Governmental reporting procedures 
might be difficult to follow. Even if it succeeds, the Finnish Government 
would have committed itself in accepting the CMC, making it hard and 
politically impossible to reverse that decision. As stated by Prime Minister 
Vanhanen “[o]ur partners have to be able to rely on the fact that our troops 
who are doing a tour of duty are also given permission to go into action by 
the national leadership”173. Yet, the actual role of national preparation and 
decision-making and the powers of Parliament are diluted, at least 
questioned if no room for open political discussion exists.  
 
Pressure is also put on the existing Peacekeeping Act. It is being reassessed 
whether it is up to date to meet the demands of the Battlegroup concept. 
One of the key questions is whether there is need for a United Nations or 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe mandate. The current 
law recognises only such mandates (Section 1). Without going into details 
of the political debate on the issue, which is analysed in the first chapter of 
this book, some general remarks ought to be made. Although the EU has 
stated to act under a UN mandate or according to general UN principles, it 
has reserved the right to act on its own. This concept has divided opinions 
in Finland. The Prime Minister has clearly demanded that Finland and the 
EU should have the opportunity to act without a UN mandate. He has 
emphasised that a EU mandate would not undermine the UN as such as the 
EU would not make a decision that “could violate the principles of the 
UN”174. Practically, it would set Finland and her partners in an awkward 
situation if Finland’s freedom of movement were closed beforehand. The 
President, on the other hand, strongly supported the current practise. This is 
consistent with the traditional Finnish line supporting the role of 
multinational institutions where all the important actors influencing Finnish 
                                                 
172 Rauhanturvaamislaki 29.6.1984/514 (Peacekeeping Act, 29 June 1984/514). 
Peacekeeping is the overall concept that is generally used in Finland for military crisis 
management and peacekeeping activities, even military observer missions.   
173 Vanhanen, 20 December 2004.  
174 Vanhanen, 16 November 2004. 
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security are included and similarly bound by its values, principles and 
decisions. Finland for both altruistic and egoistic reasons has not wanted to 
grant individual (great) powers possibility to define their own code of 
conduct and rules of international engagement. This could jeopardize the 
positions of lesser nations in general and Finland in particular. The 
President, however, changed her mind in March 2005. She considered the 
UN mandate essential but recognized that it might not always be possible 
to achieve. Four such scenarios might occur according to the President: the 
first is that both parties involved directly ask the EU to intervene; the 
second is that some permanent member of the UN Security Council is 
against a decision that otherwise would be in line with the UN Charter; 
thirdly, the issue in question is so complicated [that no agreement or 
solution can be found]; finally the UN could be against such a mission.175  
 
Section 2 of the Peacekeeping Act also defines the procedures regarding 
rules of engagement. Technically speaking the Act does not forbid peace-
enforcement activities. It requires however, that the Government, if the 
rules of engagements would be “wider than in traditional peacekeeping” 
submit a detailed report to Parliament176. To ensure faster national 
decision-making this case-by-case assessment, reporting and hearing 
procedure could be replaced by e g explicitly allowing participating in UN 
Charter Article 42 missions and requiring the Government to furnish 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee with such information (as it does 
in ESDP matters and regarding participation in peacekeeping). This would 
better respect the confidentiality of EU crisis management matters than the 
reporting procedure. Another option is that the renewed Act would require 
a proposal to be approved by Parliament.  
 
Finnish crisis management contingencies can consist of military 
formations, separate units, military observers or individual persons. 
Sending personnel or troops to Operation Headquarters, Force 
Headquarters or in the core battalion of a Battlegroup is thus within the 
existing legislation. Similarly the troop level limitation of 2000 persons 
need not be reconsidered, especially as personnel participating in training 
are excluded from the figure.177 Legislation regarding the status and rights 
of the participating personnel must be rewritten most urgently178. Current 
legislation does not recognize the need and right to use even deadly force, 
with the exception of self-defence. If a Finnish peacekeeper used deadly 
force today, the case could be taken to the Finnish court of law. Any soldier 
participating in the most robust of crisis management tasks has the right to 
                                                 
175 Uutispäivä Demari, 2 March 2004. 
176 Peacekeeping Act, June 29 1984/514, Section 2.  
177 Peacekeeping Act, June 29 1984/514, Sections 3 and 4.  
178 Kaskeala, 23 February 2005.  
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be aware of his or her right when signing in and not afterwards. Not until 
the Peacekeeping Act section 8 and the Penal Law chapters 4 and/or 45 
regarding the right and terms to use force are modified to meet the mission 
demands, can personnel be recruited from reserve and contracted. The 
same goes with the terms of service, especially for the contract soldiers 
who form an entirely new group of military profession in Finland. 
Renewed legislation ought to be written and passed quite soon as the 
soldiers for the German led Battlegroup need to enter service no later than 
early 2006 to be able to participate in joint exercises later that year179. This 
Battlegroup must be operational on January 1 2007.  
 
Finnish contribution to peacekeeping and crisis management operations 
and military observer missions has long been approximately 1000 troops 
per year. On average the Finnish contribution to the Battlegroups will 
remain in ca 18 % level180 of this figure. If the German led Battlegroup 
went to a three to four month long operation the last day of its tour of duty 
on 30 June 2007, and the personnel dedicated to the Nordic one started 
their joint exercises the next day, the theoretical percentage of the Finnish 
Battlegroup troops would remain in some 36% of the total figure. The 
number is so low that continued participation in other missions is not going 
to be jeopardized. Similarly other commitments do not hinder the setting up 
of the Battlegroups. Certain key personnel might be needed in various 
operations, but this can be foreseen – and the Battlegroups prioritized.  
 
Peacekeeping and crisis management operations are co-funded by the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs in general has stood for the salaries and daily 
allowances of the personnel. It has also financed the training and some 
exercises of the troops. For 2005 the MFA has budgeted a sum of 46,6 
million euros for crisis management operations.181 As the MOD’s budget in 
2005 for the international crisis management is 50,5 million euros, the 
MFA covers 48 % of the total sum of 97,1 million euros. The principle of 
dual financing is applied for the Battlegroups as well. The detailed sums 
are presented in the following table; in general, the MFA covers training 
and preparedness and the MOD acquisition of materiel, salaries, 
transportation and maintenance. Training and preparedness take roughly 
one third, salaries almost a half, and material acquisitions one fifth of the 
total sum reserved for the development of the Battlegroup capabilities.  
 
 
                                                 
179 Kaskeala, 23 February 2005.  
180( (200+160)/2 / 1000) * 100% = 18 %.  
181 Ministry of Finance, The Government’s budget proposal for 2005 
(http://budjetti.vm.fi/indox/tae/2005/aky_2005.html) 
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 MFA MOD Total  
2005 - 0,6 materiel 0,6  
2006 2,6 training and 
exercises, 
preparedness 
2,6 materiel 
0,3 vaccination and 
clothing 
2,1 salaries 
7,6  
2007 4,3 training and 
exercises, 
preparedness 
1,2 materiel 
0,4 vaccination and 
clothing 
5,6 salaries 
11,5 GE/NL/FI 
Battlegroup 
stand-by 
period 
January-June  
2008 0,9 training and 
exercises, 
preparedness 
3,5 salaries 4,4 SW/FI/NO/ES
Battlegroup 
stand-by 
period 
January-June 
2009  0,4 materiel 0,4  
Total 
in 
2005-
2009 
7,8 
(training, 
exercises and 
preparedness) 
16,7 
(materiel 4,8 
vaccination and 
clothing 0,7 
salaries 11,2) 
24,5 of 
which 
19 for 
personnel 
related 
costs, 
5,5 for 
material 
 
 
Table 3. The development costs of the Battlegroups troops in 2005-2009 (millions of 
euros). (Source: Ministry of Defence, Puolustusministeriön hallinnonalan toiminta- ja 
taloussuunnitelma vuosille 2006-2009 (Operational and financial plan for the Ministry 
of Defence’s segment of administration in 2006-2009). 
 
In addition to this a possible four month operation within the German-led 
Battlegroup in 2007 would require 3,1 million euros for the salaries and 2,3 
million euros for transportation and maintenance. A similar operation 
within the Swedish led Battlegroup in 2008 would cause the additional 
costs of 4,6 million euros for the salaries and 2,5 million euros for 
transportation and maintenance.182 When the regular salaries are reduced 
the total additional cost of developing Finnish Battlegroup troops is 13,3 
million euros in 2005-2009. The sum is on average ca 2,7 % of the MFA’s 
and MOD’s combined annual crisis management budget of ca 95-100 
million euros. Even when the both Battlegroups would participate in a four 
month long operation, the additional costs of 25,8 million euros remained 
                                                 
182 Ministry of Defence, Puolustusministeriön hallinnonalan toiminta- ja 
taloussuunnitelma vuosille 2006-2009 (Operational and financial plan for the Ministry 
of Defence’s segment of administration in 2006-2009).  
 89
in 5,2 % level of the total crisis management costs during the same five 
year period. The figure is explained by the relatively small amount of 
personnel participating and the short, less-than-a-year commitment, even 
with a possible operation183. The need to purchase or produce new materiel 
for the troops is minimal; most of the material is acquired or would have 
been acquired any way for the purposes of national defence, within the 
NATO PfP/PARP framework or within the Headline Goal 2003/2010 
processes. Thus neither money spent nor material used for the Battlegroup 
jeopardise Finnish participation in other current or future operations.  
 
If Finland wanted to set up a national Battlegroup or to be a Framework 
Nation, of which the latter could be assessed to be a reasonable medium to 
long-term political and military ambition, several problems would arise. 
Money, material, personnel and other commitments would then be the key 
questions to be answered. Comparing different nations can give distorted 
view as budgeting and booking are done according to national rules, 
regulations and practises. Nations also have their specific investment needs. 
Some general remarks can nevertheless be made from the current Swedish 
estimates regarding their Framework Nation responsibility. As already 
stated and elaborated in the previous chapter, Sweden will set up the core 
battalion consisting among others of two mechanised infantry and one air-
portable companies totalling some 1100 troops. The Swedish Armed 
Forces Headquarters in its preliminary and tentative estimates mention a 
total sum of ca SEK 2,2 billion – approximately 240 million euros – for the 
years 2005-2008. This is rather evenly divided between the operations and 
material.184 The sum reserved for operations, i.e. payroll, training, exercises 
and preparedness185 is SEK 1 130 million, ca 124 million euros. This figure 
can with certain reservations be compared to the similar Finnish costs. The 
contingencies that are on average approximately 6,1 times186 smaller have 
an ‘operations’ budget of 19 million euros. A Finnish contribution of 1100 
should with this logic costs 6,1 times 19 million euros, 116 million during 
the equal length of time. Thus both Swedish and Finnish calculations point 
to same direction regarding costs for personnel, training, exercises and 
preparedness. As a previous study comparing Finnish and Swedish KFOR 
battalion shows personnel costs seem to be higher in Swedish 
contingencies;187 one has to be careful with these preliminary budgets and 
                                                 
183 Finnish participation in her three main missions, KFOR in Kosovo, Althea in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and ISAF in Afghanistan cost ca 38, 21 and 12 million euros, 
respectively, in 2005 only. (Ministry of Finance, The Government’s budget proposal for 
2005 (http://budjetti.vm.fi/indox/tae/2005/aky_2005.html)). 
184 Försvarsmakten, Budgettunderlag 06, Bilaga 1, 28 February 2005, Stockholm.  
185 Anslag 6:1:1, Förbandsverksamhet, beredskap.  
186 The Swedish contingency of 1100 divided by the average of 180 troops of the 
Finnish contingencies (160 in the German led and 200 in the Nordic one). 
187 Schöön 2004, pp. 45-58.  
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calculations. Nevertheless as the Finnish budget for international crisis 
management in the foreseeable future is as mentioned roughly 90-100 
million euros per year, the sum of 110 to 120 million euros only in 
personnel expenditure in four years time would set a financial burden. This 
would cause Finland either to limit her participation in other operations, to 
reallocate existing funds or to increase the overall defence budget. None of 
these options are likely to materialize.  
 
Budgeting and booking material costs and investments differ greatly in the 
countries. The major differences are that in Sweden all the costs are 
budgeted, i.e. including ammunition and already purchased so-called war 
material, while in Finland one does not count them in. This makes it 
virtually impossible to use the Swedish tentative budget to estimate the 
costs of a hypothetical heavy Finnish Battlegroup contingency. As the 
nations also have different needs to invest for materiel, a comparison with a 
budgetary point of departure would prove to be fruitless; taking the 
Swedish commitments and the Swedish material budget of SEK 1 105 
million as a model for the Finnish estimates would not do. Yet it is clear 
that the need for material would be much bigger in case of Finland the 
Framework Nation. The three companies would require e g 24-30 CV-9030 
infantry fighting vehicles and 10-12 SISU XA-180/200 series armoured 
personnel carriers. Additional material, like trucks and high-tech systems 
for e g command, control, communications and computer systems would 
also be needed. If Finland has in developing national defence been able and 
willing to compromise and balance between material requirements and her 
scarce financial resources, all the troops and units for Battlegroup 
operations must be equipped with all necessary and high quality material 
and systems. Logistic demands and transportation costs, i.e. strategic lift, 
would increase considerably.  
 
The current demands to save 50 million euros per year, closing down 
altogether four garrisons and several depots by 2009, reducing personnel by 
1200 in the coming seven years, and the simultaneous desire to allocate one 
third of the budget for material expenditure do not make heavy investment 
in the Framework Nation responsibility a lucrative option. Even if the EU 
developed a more robust brigade level expeditionary capability and thus 
required additional troops Finland would probably maintain its 
commitment at the current or modestly increased level188. If Sweden keeps 
up with her plans of establishing a national Battlegroup in or immediately 
after 2010, it would force Finland to either find another Framework nation 
to cooperate with or allocate her resources to the German-led Battlegroup. 
                                                 
188 Combining the future 13 Battlegroups with the capabilities listed in the Helsinki 
Force Catalogue could be one solution for setting up such brigades. A Nordic brigade 
would be established within the NORDCAPS framework.  
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More suitable for the next few years is to steadily increase and widen the 
Finnish contribution than to set far too ambitious and exhaustive goals. One 
should first learn from the experiences participating nations and 
Framework Nations (Sweden in particular) are getting. Some solutions 
might at the end of the day turn to be politically unnecessary military 
burdens. Nevertheless Finland has a broad scale of existing and developing 
capabilities to offer for both platforms – the German and the Nordic. One 
can begin with the resources identified for the Battlegroups, i e coastal 
jaegers, combat engineers and demolition troops and command and control 
functions of which Finland has gained positive experiences from the 
Balkans. Another possibility is to dedicate capabilities that are developed 
within the PARP, e g FA-18 Hornets. Though more natural for Sweden, 
Finland, too could take advantage of the joint training, exercises and 
operations in order to test and even promote her arms, vehicle, technical 
and command, control and communication systems and solutions.  
 
Militarily speaking the participation in the Battlegroup packages is feasible. 
Practical problems can be solved, and, again, the participation is seen to 
support and strengthen the national defence. Capability for crisis 
management operations also increases qualitatively. New functions and 
troops are being introduced, new tasks are partly tackled with new partners. 
Changing the focus Finland has had for the crisis management, and the 
ability to produce second echelon troops that can be sustained in long-term 
operations189. How the Finnish defence and mentality can cope with the 
tasks that require well-trained professional soldiers instead of well-trained 
reservists, that are of high-intensity instead of low, and that, by nature and 
duration are more expeditionary than the ones Finland is used to see and 
contribute to is the key question. Yet, for the credibility of both the Finnish 
defence and European crisis management no room for failure exists.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
189 Kaskeala, 24 November 2004.  
 92
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 93
AUTHOR PRESENTATION 
 
 
Mika Kerttunen 
Lieutenant Colonel Mika Kerttunen is the head lecturer in strategy at the 
Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Finnish National Defence 
College. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1986, and completed 
the Finnish general staff officer course in 1995 and the Norwegian senior 
staff officer course in 1999. At the Swedish National Defence College 
Lieutenant Colonel Kerttunen served as a strategy lecturer in 2003-2004. 
He is a post-graduate student in international politics at the University of 
Helsinki. 
 
 
Tommi Koivula 
Dr. Tommi Koivula is a senior researcher at the Department of Strategic 
and Defence Studies, Finnish National Defence College. He graduated 
from the University of Tampere in 2004. Currently, he specialises in the 
European Union security policy, in particular from the French perspective. 
Previously, he has been a lecturer at the University of Tampere and a 
visiting researcher at University of Kent at Canterbury in 2001 (UK). 
 
 
Tommy Jeppsson 
Lieutenant Colonel Tommy Jeppsson is the Swedish visiting lecturer to the 
Finnish National Defence College serving at the Department of Strategic 
and Defence Studies. He graduated from the Military Academy in 
Stockholm in 1974, and completed the Swedish senior staff officer course 
in 1984 and the Norwegian senior staff officer course in 1995. Lieutenant 
Colonel Jeppsson was teaching strategy at the Norwegian Armed Forces 
Staff College in 1997-99, and at the Swedish National Defence College in 
2000-04. From autumn 2004 he took up his present posting in Finland. He 
is a member of The Royal Academy of War Sciences, the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Royal United Service Institution for 
defence Studies and Oslo Military Association.  
 
 
Previously published in this series: 
 
 
Series 2: Research Reports 
 
No 1, 1997 
Military Cooperation and its Prospects in the Baltic Sea Region 
 
No 2, 1997 
Ahti Kannisto - Tapio Palmunen - Pasi Välimäki: Muuttuuko turvallisuus- 
politiikan linja? Valtioneuvoston eduskunnalle vuosina 1995 ja 1997 
antamien turvallisuus- ja puolustuspoliittisten selontekojen vertailu 
 
No 3, 1998  
Aaro Toivonen (ed.): Russia's Security Political Prospects  
 
No 4, 1998  
Aaro Toivonen (ed.): The Present and Near Future of the Nordic Defence  
 
No 5, 1999 
Lea Ahoniemi: Suomea koskevat uudet ei-sotilaalliset 
turvallisuusuhkatekijät 
 
No 6, 2000 
Krista Huhtala (ed.): Russia’s Security Policy at the Turn of the 
Millennium 
 
No 7, 2000 
Tomas Ries (ed.): NATO Tomorrow 
 
No 8, 2000 
Pekka Sivonen (ed.): Security-Political Prospects in Northern Europe at the 
Beginning of the Millennium 
 
No 9, 2000 
Mika Kerttunen (ed.): Security in the North – Change and Continuity – 
 
No 10, 2001 
Suomen turvallisuusympäristö 2000-luvun alussa 
 
No 11, 2001 
Marc-André Ryter: EU Capabilities for Autonomous Military Crisis 
Management: Possibilities and Limits 
 
No 12, 2001 
Ossi Kervinen: Euroopan Unionin kriisinhallintatoimen päätöksenteko: 
Rakenteet ja toimintamahdollisuudet 
 
No 13, 2001 
Tomas Ries, Axel Hagelstam (eds.): Sweden and Finland. Security 
Perceptions and Defence Policy 
 
No 14, 2001 
Pentti Forsström (ed.): Russia’s Potential in the 21st Century 
 
No 15, 2002 
Pentti Forsström: Venäjä vuonna 2020: arvioita sotilaspolitiikasta ja sen 
perusteista 
 
No 16, 2002 
Joonas Sipilä (ed.): Strategian 30-vuotisjuhlaseminaari 1.3.2002 
 
No 17, 2002 
Tomas Ries, Joonas Sipilä (eds.): Drifting apart? European views of the 
Atlantic Relationship.  
 
No 18, 2002 
Marc-André Ryter: Managing Contemporary Crises: A Challenge for the 
European Union 
 
No 19, 2003 
Fred Blomberg, Jyri Saanio: Viro, Latvia ja Liettua turvallisuuspoliittisten 
muutosten kynnyksellä. Baltian maiden integraatioratkaisujen vaikutukset 
Suomen turvallisuuspoliittiseen asemaan 
 
No 20, 2003 
Osmo Tuomi: Seuraako Euroopan unioni aikaisempien suurvaltojen 
kehitystä  
 
No 21, 2003 
Kaarle Lagerstam, Juha-Antero Puistola, Torsti Sirén: Yhdysvaltalainen 
sotilasstrategia tänään 
 
No 22, 2003 
Kalevi Ruhala, Pekka Sivonen, Teija Tiilikainen, Pauli Järvenpää: Suomen 
turvallisuuspolitiikan vaihtoehdot 
 
 
 
No 23, 2003 
Marc-André Ryter: Motives for Humanitarian Intervention and the 
International Community 
 
No 24, 2003 
Kaarle Lagerstam: Yhdysvaltojen turvallisuuspolitiikka kylmän sodan 
jälkeen  
 
No 25, 2004 
Joonas Sipilä, Erko Mikkola (eds.): Terrorism and Counter-terrorism – 
Impact on Defence and other Security Systems 
 
No 26, 2004 
Torsti Sirén, Juha-Antero Puistola, Jyri Raitasalo, Kari Takamaa, Arvi 
Tavaila: Turvallisuuspoliittisten vaihtoehtojen Suomen puolustus-
järjestelmälle aiheuttamia vaikutuksia 
 
No 27, 2004 
Pentti Forsström, Erko Mikkola (eds.): Russian Military Policy and 
Strategy 
 
No 28, 2004 
Arvi Tavaila, Pentti Forsström, Pertti Inkinen, Juha-Antero Puistola, Torsti 
Sirén: Venäjän asevoimat ja sotilasstrategia 
 
No 29, 2005 
Erko Mikkola (ed.): The Future of Multilateral Security Co-operation in the 
New Security Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategian laitos 
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu 
PL 266 
00171 HELSINKI 
 
Department of Strategic and Defence Studies 
National Defence College 
POB 266 
FIN - 00171 HELSINKI 
FINLAND 
 
Tel: +358 9 181 26320 
Fax: +358 9 181 26324 
E-mail: strategian.laitos@mil.fi 
Internet: http://www.mpkk.fi/ 
